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The primary objective of this study was to provide a
basis for improving the effectiveness of Weapon Systems
Management within the Naval Air Systems Command.
An organizational analysis of all phases of the man-
agement process was performed in order to identify which
parts of the process might need improvement. The basic
source of data was field interviews with practicing Project
and Weapon Systems Managers and their staffs. Additional
data was collected from review of applicable Defense Depart-
ment directives and instructions.
The two distinct Weapon Systems Management organiza-
tions, Project Management and Model Management, were
defined in terms of their organizational characteristics.
An evaluation was then made to determine adequacy of the
organizations' abilities and assets to accomplish their
operational requirements
.
The result of the evaluation indicates that while there
are good features to the Weapon Systems Management process,
there are many areas needing improvement that reduce overall
effectiveness
.
The study also provides a comprehensive source for under-
standing the overall Weapon Systems Management organization
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A. STATEMENT OF PROBLEM
The organizational structure of the Naval Air Systems Command
has been undergoing some gradual but rather significant changes. Con-
tinuous efforts have been made to make it more efficient by reorganizing
and consolidating various functions. There has also been a trend to de-
centralize as evidenced by the translation of management responsibilities
on a number of weapon systems from the Naval Air Systems Command
Headquarters in Washington, D.C. to selected Field Activities.
One major change that previously took place in early 1973 was the
establishment of the NAVAIRSYSCOM Model Management Program in
which overall management responsibilities on certain out-of-production
aircraft were reassigned to selected Naval Air Rework Facilities. The
program has since been extended to include additional weapon systems
assigned to different types of Field Activities.
There are current attempts to improve logistics management on
out-of-production weapon systems assigned to Model Management.
This includes the reassignment of Cognizant Field Activity engineering
and material management responsibilities to the Model Management
office. Also, a proposed Material Management Program is currently
being prototyped in the F-4 Model Management office at the Naval Air
Rework Facility, North Island, California. The proposed program

will consolidate functional responsibilities currently being performed
by the Aviation Supply Office, the Naval Air Systems Command Head-
quarters, and their representatives in the areas of aircraft and com-
ponent rework/modification.
Another major change that is currently underway is the establish-
ment of the Naval Aviation Logistics Center, Patuxent River, Maryland
on October 1, 1977. This Center will be the new central activity for
providing overall logistics support to the Fleet. Former functional
logistics support groups located at the Naval Air Systems Command
Headquarters and certain Field Activities are currently being re-
located to this new Center.
These reassignments of program responsibility are quite often
accomplished with the good intentions of reducing the bureaucratic
structure at the Headquarters level but with the detrimental effect of




and support necessary to
maintain total program effectiveness. This applies to management of
weapon systems remaining at Headquarters as well as those that have
been reassigned. It was because of these changes and the apparent
lack of understanding by all concerned of the overall Weapon Systems
Management organization including those requirements that make it
effective that this study was undertaken.

B. OBJECTIVE OF STUDY
The primary objective of this study was to improve the effective-
ness of Weapon Systems Management within the Naval Air Systems
Command.
Additional objectives in support of the primary objective were:
1. To identify both good features as well as deficiencies in
the Weapon Systems Management organization with the intent of in-
fluencing corrective action.
2. To clearly define Weapon Systems Management in terms
of its basic organizational elements.
3. To provide a source for understanding the Weapon Systems
Management organization for both participants and non-participants.
C. OUTLINE OF STUDY
Section I presents a brief introduction by discussing the problem
and objectives of the study.
Section II provides overall background for the study by discussing
the history of Weapon Systems Management, the different organizational
arrangements, basic definitions, life-cycle management concepts, and
general systems and organizational diagnosis theory.
Section III describes the procedures used in the collection of data,
and in the definition and evaluation of the Weapon Systems Management
organization.

Section IV provides a detailed definition of the Weapon Systems
Management organization by the application of a Systems Analysis
Model.
Section V provides an evaluation of the two distinct Weapon Systems
Management organizations, Project Management and Model Management.
The evaluation determined the adequacy of Project and Model Manage-
ment to accomplish their basic operational requirements.
Section VI summarizes the overall study and provides specific




A. HISTORY OF WEAPON SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT
Since World War II, there have been significant advancements in
technology due primarily to large expenditures for research and develop-
ment in both the public and private sectors.
The advent of large complex programs have caused the Government
and private industry to adapt their organizational structures away from
the traditional functional designs. Whenever the task involved coordina-
tion of large numbers of agencies and people, the traditional functional
approach ceased to be effective. In addition, the conditions of accel-
erated technology and urgent schedules made it necessary to establish
centralized management organizations to provide overall integration
of the many diverse functional groups. There have been various terms
used to designate these centralized management organizations such as
Program Management, Project Management, and Weapon Systems
Management. They all, however, have in common the characteristic
of centralized integrative management on a system basis [Kast and
Rosenzweig, P. 231].
Within the Department of Defense and defense related industries,
the term Weapon Systems Management has evolved. The Weapon Sys-
tems Management concept emphasizes the timely integration of all
aspects of a weapon system including the establishment of operational

requirements through design, development, production, training,
operation, and logistics support. The weapon system is a total entity
which comprises equipment and facilities in combination to form an
instrument of combat [Johnson, Kast, and Rosenzweig, P. 138].
The single central executive designated to manage a major weapon
system within the Department of Defense is called a Program or Project
Manager.
After World War II, there were evidences of Project Managers
on such endeavors as the Manhattan Project, the ballistic missile
program, and the Polaris Program. One of the early forerunners of
the Project Manager was the "project expeditor" who had no line func-
tion responsibility, but informally motivated others in the functional
areas. Another forerunner was the "project coordinator" who had
more formal responsibility toward coordinating the overall activities in
the functional groups toward a specific objective. Although he was
free to make decisions within the framework of project objectives,
he did not participate in management functions outside of his organiza-
tion [Cleland, P. 83].
The manager of a weapon system within the Department of Defense
today is responsible for actively participating in the basic functions of
management - planning, organizing, directing, and controling overall
aspects of the project. There are, however, different organizational
arrangements which determine his relationships with the other functional





The traditional way for organizations to define their structure is
by charts showing the hierarchy, line -staff relationships, and the dif-
ferent functional divisions. However, the informal structure, which
reflects the actual interfunctional relationships and communication
channels, is not normally shown. Typical functions with an organiza-
tion are engineering, manufacturing, marketing, finance, and adminis-
tration. There are three basic organizational arrangements currently




Figure 2-1 shows a typical functional organization. The Chief
Engineer has line managers as well as staff personnel reporting to him.
Each line manager is responsible for managing a particular functional
department within the organization. The responsibility for a given
project is normally assigned to one of the functional departments until
that phase of the project is finished. It will then be transferred to
succeeding functional departments until the overall project is completed.
Table 2-1 provides a list of advantages and disadvantages of the func-
tional organization. [Kline].
2 . Project Organization
The project organization was established to integrate the
many diverse functional groups required to support large complex
programs where cost and schedule were of critical importance. The
project organization is temporary in nature since it is normally
20

disestablished after the project has been completed.
The pure project organization is a self-contained unit whereby
the Project Manager has both administrative and functional control over
all personnel assigned to the project. Since project personnel are
detached from their functional departments, all matters relating to
hiring, firing, performance appraisals, and assignments are the
responsibility of the Project Manager.
Figure 2-2 shows a typical project organization in which all
aspects of the project such as engineering, manufacturing, quality
control, and contract administration are controlled by the Project
Manager. In this particular organization, the Project Manager reports
directly to the General Manager. There are different variations of the
project organization, however. One typical variation, as shown in
figure 2-3, is that only technical aspects of the project are controlled
by the Project Manager, and he reports directly to the Chief Engineer
who is subordinate to the General Manager. Table 2-2 provides a list
of advantages and disadvantages of the project organization [Kline].
3. Matrix Organization
Figure 2-4 shows a typical matrix organization. The lines of
project authority cut across departmental boundaries to form a grid
or matrix type structure. The matrix organization is actually a hybrid
form between the functional and project organization. It was designed
to incorporate the good features of the functional and project organiza-



























ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF THE
FUNCTIONAL ORGANIZATION
ADVANTAGES
Less total manpower required
Good crossfeed of information among programs
Continuity from program to program
Efficiency and flexibility in the use of manpower
Broader manpower base
Good technical direction
Lines of promotion are clear (technically)
Relative stability and security
Established and consistent procedures
Technical personnel judged for advancement by peers
Good informal organization
High morale
Creative environment for technical advancement
DISADVANTAGES
Discipline (technology) oriented rather than program oriented
Difficulty in selection of project managers
Sometimes "research" rather than application oriented
Too narrow a view of program requirements
May have poor coordination across technical groups
Not all engineers are equally good at management, nor do they





Promotion path and rewards sometimes go to project engineer
Interface with customer often poor















































































































































































ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF THE PROJECT ORGANIZATION
ADVANTAGES
Close coordination contact with customer
Concentrated authority and responsibility-
Direct control by Project Manager of all personnel
Project Manager can make authoritative and binding decisions
Task oriented - can act quickly
Good project schedule and cost control
Good program visibility
Sometimes develops Program Managers from functional people
Only one group disturbed when project completed
Accounting is easier
Sometimes best for very large, long duration programs
DISADVANTAGES
Inconsistency in policies, procedures, and operations from
project to project.
Depends primarily on leadership ability of Project Manager
Crossfeed of technical information is generally poor
Functional groups in organization tend to neglect the project
Duplication of skills and facilities - higher cost to overall
organization
Lower job stability and security for project personnel





People tend to be graded on cost and schedule performance rather
than technical excellence
Technical direction may be weak
Competition for technical talent
Divided loyalty of personnel between project and former functional
group
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ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF MATRIX ORGANIZATION
ADVANTAGES
fc— —
Provides system of checks and balances between program and
functional managers
Good horizontal as well as vertical communication
Has many desirable qualities of both functional and project
organizations
Flexible use of manpower
Stable functional groups
Technical excellence
Technical supervision of functional people
Good cost and schedule control
Good crossfeed of information
Close coordination with customer
Good program visibility
Good interface management - can otpimize technical performance
with cost and schedule
Reasonable size work force
Project personnel can concentrate on program task management -
technical personnel can concentrate on functional performance
Promotes purposeful conflict
Specialists can be made available from functional group reservoir
to solve technical problems in crisis situations
Rotating personnel between projects and functions can develop
future managers







Priorities - competition among projects for technical people
Balance of power between Project and Functional Managers not
always clearly defined
Dominant personalities can sometimes prevail
Overlap of authority and responsibility is possible
Technical personnel might try to take advantage of dual reporting
role
Divided loyalty of technical personnel
31

In the matrix organization, technical personnel are functionally-
assigned to the Project Manager but remain administratively assigned
to the functional departments. The Project Manager exercises his
authority over functional personnel regarding "what" and "when" project
support is provided while the functional department managers deter-
mine "how" project support will be given. The Project Manager
normally has a small staff that assists in the overall management task
and report directly to him on the progress of the project. Table 2-3
provides a list of advantages and disadvantages of the matrix organiza-
tion [Kline].
C. LIFE-CYCLE MANAGEMENT CONCEPTS
This study has defined Weapon Systems Management in the broad
sense to mean the centralized management and integration of all aspects
of a weapon system throughout its complete life-cycle . Weapon systems
Management within the Navy is designed around a matrix organization
as defined in Section II. B. 3. During the acquisition of an airborne
weapon system, a project office is established, and the manager will
usually be a Chief of Naval Material designated Project Manager (PMA)
or an Aircraft Project Coordinator (APC) established within the Naval
Air Systems Command. After the completion of all production con-
tracts and all major modification programs, the project office is
normally disestablished. The Assistant Project Manager for Logistics
(APML) assumes lead management responsibility and continues to
32

support all logistics aspects of the program. The Class Desk engineer
maintains lead responsibility for the basic design of the weapon system.
At some point in time after the program stabilizes (fewer logistics
problems, configuration changes, etc. ), the total program responsibility
will usually be transferred to a Weapon Systems Manager (WSM) at an
appropriate Field Activity under the NAVAIRSYSCOM Model Manage-
ment program.
When considering the management aspects of a weapon system
throughout its complete life-cycle, one way to view the process is by
dividing it into three distinct management phases: (1) Pre-Production
Phase, (2) Production Phase, and (3) Out- of- Production Phase.
Figure 2-5 presents continuums illustrating the degree of program
participation by the various managers and the major types of funds
utilized during these three phases. These concepts are described in
the following paragraphs.
1 . Pre-Production Phase
This phase encompasses the total DSARC/NSARC (Defense/
Navy Systems Acquisition Review Council) process which includes
Milestone (Program Initiation), Milestone I (Demonstration and
Validation of Alternatives), Milestone II (Authorization for Full- Scale
Engineering Development), Milestone III (Authorization for Full-Scale
Production and Deployment). The Pre-Production Phase involves the
administration and execution of primarily RDT&E funds over which
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also part of the project team during this phase and assumes the weapon
systems acquisition management role which includes lead engineering
responsibility for basic systems design. This also includes the manage-
ment of test and evaluation programs to verify design performance.
Another important team member is the APML (AIR -410) who assumes
lead responsibility for development of a viable integrated logistics
support (ILS) plan.
2. Production Phase
The milestone III decision by the Secretary of Defense is the
authorization point for full-scale production. This normally takes
place after completion of engineering development, OPEVAL approval
of the weapon system for service use, Board of Inspection Survey
acceptance, and ASN(I&cL) approval and recommendation of the system
for production.
Just prior to and during the early part of the Production Phase,
the PMA/APC administers and executes his budget using primarily new
procurement APN- 1 (or WPN) funds. Other types of out-of-production
support funds such as APN-5, APN-6, APN-7, (or certain types of
WPN funds), OPN, SCN, and O&MN funds must also be budgeted to
support the weapon system when it becomes operational in the Fleet.
The PMA/APC does not have control over these out-of-production
funds, however, he is responsible for ensuring that budgetary inputs




Quite often, during the Production Phase, the weapon system's
configuration must be modified to include certain unforeseen improve-
ments. Also, after the initial production contract, there may be
follow-on contracts to procure additional weapon systems of the same
series or of a later series. As long as the weapon system is still in
production, correction of basic design problems can be accomplished
using initial production (APN- 1 or WPN) funding over which the PMA/
APC exercises full control. Non-conformance with approved specifica-
tions while the weapon system is still under warranty can often be
corrected at no cost to the Government. Retrofit kits to update the
systems already operational in the Fleet to the current production
configuration must be procured using APN-5 (or certain types of WPN)
funds. Aircraft modification APN-5 funds are administered by AIR-
1041.
During the Production Phase, the Class Desk (AIR-510) con-
tinues his team responsibility for basic design and sponsors changes in
the configuration of the system before the Change Control Board. On
some projects, a member of the Project Manager's staff sponsors the
changes before the Board.
The role of the APML (AIR-410) increases during the Produc-
tion Phase in preparation for logistics support requirements of the
weapon system when it becomes operational in the Fleet.
36

3. Out- of- Production Phase
The weapon system is considered out-of-production following
the completion of the last production unit. It is not unusual, however,
for an earlier series to be out-of-production while a later series of
the same type and model is still in production (example: A-7C and
A-7E). At the termination of the last production contract, the acquisi-
tion function of the PMA/APC ceases, and the project office is normally
disestablished. An exception to this takes place when there is a major
modification program underway. In this situation, the project office
will usually remain in operation until completion of the modification
program.
During the Out-of-Production Phase, the weapon system
management lead is initially assumed by the APML (AIR-410). This
is not an abrupt management transition since the APML has previously
had an increasing role in planning and managing the integrated logistic
support for the systems already operational in the early Production
Pha s e
.
Funding support for operational weapon systems in-production
and out-of-production normally includes APN-5, APN-6, APN-7, (or
certain types of WPN), O&MN, OPN, and SCN funds. In contrast to
the project administration of RDT&E and initial procurement (APN-
1
or WPN) funds for a particular weapon system, these out-of-production
funds are normally managed within NAVAIRSYSCOM by designated
budget administrators in the functional areas who have to support all
37

operational weapon systems. Modifications to out-of-production air-
craft weapon systems are funded by the Operational Safety Improvement
Program (OSIP). For example, OSIP APN-5 funds are administered
by AIR- 1041, and rework modification O&MN funds are administered
by AIR-4148.
After an initial transition period, and the management of the
program becomes more stable (fewer logistics problems, changes,
etc. ), the total systems management responsibility is usually trans-
lated to a Field Activity such as a Naval Air Rework Facility and
assigned to a Weapon Systems Manager (WSM) under the NAVAIRSYS-
COM Model Management program. The Model Management concept
effectively decentralizes the management of a weapon system from
NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ to a field office with an equivalent Project Man-
ager, Project Deputy, Class Desk, APML, and other staff managers.
The Model Management program is still a matrix organization since
the various functional groups at NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ and Field Activities
have the responsibility to provide support to the program when
required.
D. GENERAL SYSTEMS THEORY
A system may be defined as a group of elements or subsystems
exhibiting a set of interrelationships and interacting together toward
one or more goals and objectives [Alexander, P. 4].
38

One way to define an organization is by the use of an appropriate
systems model. Systems theory states that an organization open to
outside influence, such as weapon systems management within the
Naval Air Systems Command, can be represented by a dynamic open
systems model. Such a model is shown in figure 2-6. The basic
model consists of inputs, a processor and controller, and outputs with
feedback. The processor transforms the inputs into outputs in accord-
ance with the operating rules of the controller. The feedback path
indicates that the inputs are influenced by the outputs. A simple illus-
tration of this process is as follows: Assume that the NAVAIB.SYSCOM
weapon systems management organization receives input funding for
research and development whereby it processes the funding by contract-
ing for the effort. If the output is an acceptable weapon system design,
this in turn provides feedback that will influence the type and amount
of input funding received for the next phase of the program such as
full scale development.
Figure 2-7 represents an expanded version of the basic model in
which the processor and controller are represented by the following
subsystems: Organizational Variables, Task Attributes, Informal
Social System, and Human Dimensions [Dean]. This model has been
further expanded and refined into a Systems Analysis Model for use
in defining the NAVAIB.SYSCOM weapon systems management organiza-



































DYNAMIC OPEN SYSTEMS MODEL OF AN ORGANIZATION

E. ORGANIZATIONAL DIAGNOSIS THEORY
In order to diagnose an organization, it must first be defined.
One way to accomplish this is to view the organization as (1) a set of
functional or divisional strategies, (2) a set of personal strategies,
(3) a set of personal abilities, and (4) a set of relationships [Uyterhoeven,
Ackerman, and Rosenblum, P. 73].
In terms of the weapon systems management organization within
NAVAIRSYSCOM, the above characteristics were identified as the
(1) Operational Requirements, and (2) Abilities and Assets of the
organization.
The Operational Requirements were the Mission/Goals and Respon-
sibilities of the organization as defined in the Systems Analysis Model
in Section IV under Task Attributes.
The Abilities and Assets were the Model Inputs, Outputs, Or-
ganizational Variables, Informal Social System, and Human Dimensions.
Once the organization has been defined, its adequacy must then be
evaluated to complete the diagnosis. The test of adequacy determines
the organization's (1) capability to support corporate strategy, (2)
capability to meet environmental threats, and (3) capability to dis-
charge its key operational requirements [Uyterhoeven, Ackerman,
and Rosenblum, P. 76].
Relating these tests of adequacy to the NAVAIRSYSCOM weapon
systems management organization simply means an evaluation to
determine if the Abilities and Assets of the organization are sufficient
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to accomplish its Operational Requirements. The procedure used in
this evaluation is described in more detail in Section III.
F. SUMMARY
This Section has attempted to provide the basic background con-
sidered essential to a full understanding of the study.
A brief review of the history of Weapon Systems Management
reveals that it evolved to meet the demands of large complex programs
with the Department of Defense in an environment of accelerated tech-
nology and urgent schedules.
Further investigation shows that there are three basic organiza-
tional arrangements utilized by Weapon Systems Management: (1) Func
tional Organization, (2) Project Organization, and (3) Matrix Organiza-
tion. Each organizational arrangement has its advantages and dis-
advantages. The Matrix organization is an attempt to utilize the best
features of both the Functional and Project Organization.
An analysis of Weapon Systems Management required a basic
comprehension of certain life-cycle management concepts that were
presented in this Section. It was found that the management life-cycle
of a weapon system could be divided into three distinct phases: (1) Pre-
Production, (2) Production, and (3) Out-of-Production. The require-
ments to manage each phase were found to be significantly different.
Systems theory states that a management organization open to
outside environmental influence can be represented by a dynamic
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open systems model. The Systems Analysis Model utilized in Section IV
to define the NAVAIRSYSCOM Weapon Systems Management organization
was developed from a basic dynamic open systems model.
Organizational diagnosis theory states that diagnosis begins with
the definition of the organization's basic operational requirements and
its abilities and assets. An evaluation must then be made to determine
the adequacy of the organization's abilities and assets to accomplish its
basic operational requirements. The procedures utilized in this study
in Section V to evaluate the NAVAIRSYSCOM Weapon Systems Manage-




A. COLLECTION OF DATA
The basic source of data for this study was from practicing Pro-
ject and Weapon Systems Managers and their staffs. Interviews were
held with thirty-five experienced project personnel from twenty out of
the approximately thirty total Project and Model Management offices
at NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ and various Field Activities. The interviews
consisted of general discussions about organizational design, short
and long term goals, management problems, recommended improve-
ments, and a ranking of basic elements considered essential to effec-
tive project management. Refer to the Interview Outline in Appendix A.
Additional data was also collected from review of applicable Defense
Department directives and instructions.
B. ORGANIZATIONAL DEFINITION
The problem of how to best present the collected information in an
organized format to define the management organization was accom-
plished by the use of a Systems Analysis Model. The model was
developed by tailoring a general dynamic system model to the NAVAIR-
SYSCOM Weapon Systems Management situation.
The three life-cycle phases of Weapon Systems Management, as
described in Section II, were then defined in terms of the model's sub-





Two distinct Weapon Systems Management organizations were
defined, Project Management and Model Management . There were
four basic steps used to evaluate the Project and Model Management
organizations. These are illustrated in figure 3-1 and described as
follows:
1. The first step consisted of reviewing the organization's
characteristics in terms of its operational requirements and its
abilities and assets to accomplish those requirements. The organiza-
tional characteristics from Section IV were summarized and presented
in table format in Section V.
2. The second step was a review of the management problems
reported in the interviews. This gave key insight regarding deficiencies
in the organization and was used along with the other data in determin-
ing organizational adequacy.
3. The third step was a review of the ranking results of the
essential elements to effective Project and Model Management . This
gave important insight regarding the relative degree of significance
Project and Weapon Systems Managers placed on certain assets. This





















4. The fourth step was an evaluation to determine the
organization's adequacy to accomplish its operational requirements .
Resulting conclusions were reached based upon information reviewed




A. SYSTEMS ANALYSIS MODEL
Section II discussed some general systems theory and presented a
simplified model for use in this organizational analysis of NAVAIR-
SYSCOM Weapon Systems Management. In addition, the three life-
cycle phases of a weapon system (1) Pre-Production, (2) Production,
and (3) Out- of- Production, were presented. Section III described the
planned methodology of the analysis whereby organization definition
was first achieved through the application of this model. The model
served as an inventory of various aspects of each management life-
cycle phase. Because of the complexity of the management situation
involved, however, only those sub- system elements of the model
considered pertinent to the purpose of this study were emphasized
with brief comment on those elements of lesser significance. Once
the organization was defined, it was then evaluated in terms of its
adequacy to meet strategic goals, defined problems, and in terms of
those elements considered essential for effective management.
Figure 4-1 illustrates the Systems Analysis Model used to define
the Weapon Systems Management organization [Adapted from Dean].






b. Strategies and Plans
c. Information
2. Outputs





c. Formal Mechanisms (SOP's)





b. Risk and Uncertain Events
c. Time Horizon
d. Environmental Interaction
e. Highly Complex Tasks
f. High Technology











5. Informal Social System
a. Informal Leadership
b. Project Cohesion
c. Informal Status System
d. Political Alliances and Coalitions
6. Human Dimensions
a. Experience and Educational Levels
b. Other Human Dimensions
B. SYSTEMS ANALYSIS OF LIFE-CYCLE MANAGEMENT PHASES
1 . Inputs
a. Resources
(1) People . During both the Pre-Production and Produc-
tion Phases, major projects are normally headed up by a CNO chart-
ered Project Manager, Aircraft (PMA), and minor projects by a
NAVAIRSYSCOM designated Aircraft Project Coordinator (APC), as
defined in Appendix D. Because of the matrix organization used by
the Navy, the number of people on a typical NAVAIRSYSCOM project
office staff is relatively small especially when one considers the large
degree of technical, managerial, and financial responsibility assumed.
For example, a small project may have as little as five or six people
while the largest project will usually have no more than 25 or 30 people,
The project office staff will usually consist of one or more military
and/or civilian deputies and their assistants for such areas as fiscal
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control, planning, air vehicles, weapons, logistics support, foreign
military sales, etc. The support groups to the project office consist
of the Contracting Officer, Comptroller, a Class Desk, Assistant
Project Manager for Logistics (APML), and their respective support
teams in the functional areas at NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ and Field Activities.
The project office normally is disestablished following
the completion of the last production contract, and the APML assumes
the lead management responsibility for the weapon system. The par-
ticipating managers in the functional areas continue to support the
program, although by this time they may have been assigned to also
support newer weapon systems. At some point in time (since January
1973) during the Out- of- Production Phase when the management of the
weapon system becomes more stable, the project is normally assigned
to a Weapon Systems Manager (WSM) at a Field Activity under the
NAVAIR Model Management Program. The Model Management Office
is normally staffed by the WSM, a Deputy Manager, Class Desk, APML,
and/or other specialized engineering and logistics managers. The
matrix organization is still utilized since Participating Managers in
the functional areas at NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ and Field Activities are
called on by the model management office to support the weapon system
when required.
Other project related groups that provide inputs to
the project office are identified in figure 4-2 and includes Congress,
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Executive Agencies, contractors, the Fleet, OSD, SECNAV, CNO,
CNM, Laboratories, Test Facilities, and various Field Activities.
(2) Funding. The Pre-Production Phase involves the
budget formulation, administration, execution, and expenditures of
primarily RDT&E funds. Also during the Pre-Production Phase ap-
proximately 2-1/2 years prior to the DSARC/NSARC III milestone,
new procurement APN-1 (or WPN and sometimes OPN and SCN) funds
must be budgeted to support the production contracts in the next phase
of the project life cycle. By definition (DOD DIR 5000. 1), the anticip-
ated funding expenditures of a major project exceeds $75 million for
RDT&E and $300 million for procurement. The PMA/APC has finan-
cial control of his budget during this phase although he must continually
justify and defend them to higher authority to prevent them from being
cut.
In addition to the new procurement funds that are
being expended during the Production Phase, there are other types of
out-of-production support funds that must be budgeted (approximately
2-1/2 years leadtime required) such as APN-5, APN-6, APN-7, and
O&MN funds. These out-or-production funds are needed to support
the weapon system when it becomes operational in the Fleet. Neither
the PMA/APC nor WSM have administrative control over these out-of-
production funds. They are, however, responsible for providing
budgetary inputs for support of their project to the designated budget
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administrator (Requiring Manager). In contrast to the project adminis-
tration of RDT&cE and initial procurement funds for a particular weapon
system, the out-of-production funds are normally managed within
NAVAIRSYSCOM by designated budget administrators (Requiring
Managers) in the functional areas who have to support all operational
weapon systems. AIR-4144, for example, administers O&MN funds
for rework of aircraft and missiles. Modifications to out-of-production
aircraft weapon systems are funded by the Operational Safety Improve-
ment Program (OSIP). AIR- 1041 is responsible for administering
OSIP APN-5 funds.
(3) Facilities . Facilities normally available to the
weapon system project during all three phases include contractor's
plants and the various in-house Navy facilities such as Navy Research
and Development Laboratories, Test and Evaluation Facilities, Naval
Air Rework Facilities, etc. Use of these facilities, however, is
almost always dependent upon the availability of project funds to pay
for their services. This is a severe handicap to older projects,
especially after the systems have gone out-of-production and support
funds are extremely scarce or non-existent. For example, there may
be an operational need to redesign a particular component installation
on an out-of-production aircraft to improve or extend its overall
performance as a system. The lack of available funding to perform
the required test and evaluation and follow-up engineering design

might delay for several years or prevent altogether any corrective
action.
b. Strategies and Plans
Input strategies and plans to the project are primarily
the result of direction from higher authority. Many of these are
formalized and published in various documents. However, the per-
sonal strategies of the Project or Weapon Systems Manager and his
staff must also be considered. It is important to note that the input
strategies to the project should be congruent with the Goal Orientation
(Task Attribute ) and the Formal Planning Mechanisms ( Organizational
Variable ) of the project. Input strategies and plans are contained
for the most part in the following sources:
(1) Project Charter and Model Management Instruction.
The project charter establishes the mission, authority, and responsi-
bility of the Project Manager during the Systems Acquisition Cycle,
which includes both the Pre-Production and Production Phases of the
project. The Model Management Instruction, NAVAIRINST 5400. 70,
does the same for the Weapon Systems Manager during the Out-of-
Production Phase. In addition, the project scope, operating relation-
ships, procedures, organization, and resources are defined.
(2) Integrated Logistics Support Plan . During the early
phases of the project, the APML has developed an Integrated Logistics
Support (ILS) Plan which defines the logistics support strategy and
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plans for the duration of the project. The Weapon Systems Manager
continues with this plan and revises it accordingly to meet changing
program requirements.
(3) POD Component Directives and Instructions . Examples
DOD DIR 5000. 1 and SECNAVINST 5000. 1 (as revised by OMB Circular
A-109) establish the policies, strategies, and management principles
for systems acquisition.
(4) CNO Strategies, Carrier Deployment Schedulers, and
Weapon Systems Planning Document (WSPD) . Example: OP-05, OP-506,
and Type Commanders establish aircraft force level mixes and carrier
deployment dates which are reflected in the WSPD and Carrier Deploy-
ment Schedules.
(5) Congressional Strategies . Example: Authorization
of funding for specific aircraft force levels.
(6) Personal Project Manager Strategies . Individual
strategies of each PMA/APC or WSM to defend, justify, and support
his project.
c. Information
The following include various sources of information
available to the project office:
(1) Management Information Systems . Examples are:
3M data, Unsatisfactory Reports (UR's), Readiness Improvement




(2) Reports . Examples are: test, performance, and
field type reports.
(3) Meetings and Conferences . Examples are: congres-
sional committee meetings, DSARC/NSARC, Integrated Logistics Sup-
port (ILS) meetings, design review meetings, etc.
2 . Outputs
a. Productivity (various measures)
(1) Accomplishing Milestones . During the Pre-Production
and Production Phases of the weapon system, various formal programs
are normally in effect which have established milestones. One of the
measures of productivity by which the Project Manager is judged is
how well these milestones are met relative to schedule and performance.
Some examples of these milestones are DSARC/NSARC 0, I, II and III,
SAR milestones, and Fleet Introduction. Other milestones to be met
after the weapon system has been deployed and after the system has
gone out-of-production are: Integrated Logistics Support (ILS) mile-
stones for support in meeting designated carrier deployments, and
various milestones involved in updating selected component systems
of the weapon system such as in a Conversion in Lieu of Procurement
(CILOP)/Service Life Extension Program (SLEP).
(2) Budget Management. Another measure of productivity
is in the area of budget management. The Project Manager is respon-
sible for planning, programming, and, when appropriate, reprogram-
ming of project funds. The project office is also responsible for budget

justification, execution, and control. Sometimes, new or unbudgeted
requirements materialize and the need for additional funds must be
justified to higher authority. The success of the overall project is
usually determined by how well the Project Manager and his staff
can defend and manage his budget. During the Out- of- Production Phase,
the available funds to the weapon system are normally managed by
designated budget administrators (Requiring Managers) in the functional
areas of NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ. Although the APML or the designated
WSM does not normally have budgetary control over out-of-production
funds, they are responsible for providing program budgetary inputs
to the designated budget administrator.
(3) Weapon System Design Performance. One of the
primary goals of the project during the Pre-Production Phase is for the
weapon system to meet its designed performance relative to operation,
reliability, and maintainability. Upon completion of engineering
development, the new weapon system's operational performance must
be certified for servise use as evidenced by Board of Inspection Survey
(BIS) acceptance. Although this is a DSARC/NSARC III milestone prior
to authorization for production, quite often BIS trial discrepancies are
waived in order to meet Fleet commitments with the intent of correct-
ing them concurrently with initial production. Problems with maintain-
ability and reliability of the system do not normally surface until
after the systems are introduced to the Fleet and they are deployed.
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How well the weapon system meets its designed performance is a
direct reflection on the quality of specifications, type of contract,
availability of funds, and quality of management during the early phase
of the acquisition process.
(4) Weapon System Readiness (Logistics Support) .
Although the actual logistics support does not occur until after Fleet
introduction, the APML has the responsibility during the early part of
the Pre-Production Phase to develop a viable integrated logistics sup-
port plan and ensure that his logistics requirements are an input to the
early systems design. Again, the readiness of the weapon system after
deployment is also a direct reflection on the quality of management and
planning during the early phase of the acquisition process.
The logistics support problems occur, however,
after the weapon systems have actually been deployed, and especially
during the Out-of-Production Phase. During this phase, the measures of
project productivity are: responsiveness to urgent Fleet problems;
material support (components and spare parts); technical manual sup-
port; support equipment; aircraft and component rework; maintenance
engineering support; and support to shipboard interface requirements.
Some Project Managers contend that the biggest payoff in aircraft
readiness is in the area of Integrated Logistics Support (ILS).
b. Project Development (Growth or Decline)
(1) Actual Expenditures . One measure of the develop-
ment of a project is in the growth or decline in fund expenditures.
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Typically, however, the RDT&cE expenditures are the greatest during
the Concept Formulation or early part of the Pre-Production Phase,
and they taper down during the Contract Definition or latter part. With
the start of the Production Phase, new procurement expenditures are
the greatest as a result of the new production contract. Follow-on
procurements may show an increase or decrease in expenditures,
depending on the size of the buys. After the weapon system goes out-
of-production, the total expenditures normally decline since procure-
ments are confined to modification kits, spare parts, support equip-
ment, technical manual, and data package updates. Also, out-of-
production modification funds are scarce and must be competed for
between all out-of-production weapon systems. The expenditure of
funds on an older weapon system may again increase however, by a
Conversion in Lieu of Procurement (CIL OP) /Service Life Extension
Program (SLEP).
(2) Size and Rank of Project Staff. Typically, the
number of personnel assigned to a project starts off small and grows
as the project develops. The rank of the Project Manager and his
staff quite often will increase as the size and importance of the project
increases. The project size will normally peak during the latter part
of the Pre-Production Phase and carry over into the Production Phase
where it gradually declines until completion of the last production
contract, and the project office is disestablished. The project takes
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on new vitality again when a Weapon Systems Manager is assigned
and a Model Management office is established at a Field Activity.
It would be a wrong assumption, however, to believe
that the size of a project staff is solely dependent on the task require-
ments during any particular phase. Although that is perhaps the way
it should be, most often the number of personnel assigned to a project
is representative of the Project or Weapon Systems Manager's ability
and success in selling his personnel requirements to his Command in
an austere environment.
3 . Organizational Variables
a. Structure
Weapon Systems Management with NAVAIRSYSCOM is
based upon a matrix organization as described in Section II. During
the Pre-Production and Production Phases, the Project Manager and
his staff serve as the focal points for all inputs and outputs of the
project. The Project Manager's position is established within NAV-
AIRSYSCOM but he reports directly to his CNO sponsor (Program
Coordinator) in OP-506. The Project Manager and his staff, however,
are dependent upon support from the functional areas to carry out
project requirements. The Class Desk (AIR-510) has the lead respon-
sibility for basic design engineering on the weapon system and leads
a team of engineers from other functional areas in NAVAIR and various
Field Activities. Likewise, the APML (AIR-410) has the lead respon-
sibility for Integrated Logistics Support (ILS) and leads his team of
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participating logistic managers in functional areas of NAVAIR and
various Field Activities. Each project office is structured somewhat
differently, depending on the project size and individual requirements.
The project charter defines the structure and operating relationships
between the various organizational areas. The organizational relation-
ships between the various project related managers is illustrated in
figure 4-3.
After the system goes out-of-production and the project
office has been disestablished, the support of operational weapon
systems in the Fleet is dependent upon the various functional managers
at NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ and designated Field Activities under the lead
of the APML. The Class Desk, who still has the lead responsibility
for basic design of the weapon system, normally responds when the
APML, his team, or the Fleet report a logistics problem related to
configuration. Most APML's, Class Desks, and Participating Managers
in the other functional areas, have more than one weapon system to
support.
A Model Management office and Weapon Systems Manager
will normally be assigned the project at a Field Activity after the pro-
gram stabilizes and becomes less volatile. The Weapon Systems
Manager and his staff are administratively assigned to the Field
Activity Command where they are physically located, and functionally
assigned to COMNAVAIRSYSCOM via AIR-04. Like the project offices,
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the structures of the Model Management offices varies from one pro-
ject to another. The larger Model Management offices, however, have
a Weapon Systems Manager, a Deputy Manager, an APML, a Class
Desk, and other specialized engineering and logistics managers. In
some cases, a Financial Analyst is employed to manage funding on
special projects.
b. Authority
In a matrix organization, the Project or Weapon Systems
Manager cannot operate effectively if he relies solely on his formal
authority. His success is more likely to depend on his capability to
build alliances and influence other organizational members.
The formal authority of the Project Manager is defined
in the project charter. He is the single central executive responsible
for the successful management of the project toward accomplishment
of its objectives. He has broad directive authority over project plan-
ning, direction, control, and utilization of resources and over project
efforts of in-house and contractor organizations. As the responsible
executive, he is expected to act on his own initiative in matters affect-
ing the project. The Project Manager is assigned the specific authori-
ties set forth in SECNAVINST 5000. 1.
During the Out-of-Production Phase, the management of
the weapon system is initially assumed by the APML and later on by a
Weapon Systems Manager. The management authority is no longer

defined by specific charter but collectively with other out-of-production
systems by NAVALRINST.
The project authority for the APML is defined in NAV-
ALRINST 5000. 8. He is the principal member of his functional group
for Logistics Fleet Support. After the project office is disestablished,
he carries the authority of a Project Manager and is the focal point
for direction of all efforts concerning Integrated Logistics support
of the weapon system. He is responsible for planning, liaison, and
execution of an Integrated Logistics Support Program within his func-
tional group.
The project authority for the Weapon Systems Manager is
defined in NAVALRINST 5400. 70. The extent of his authority is essen-
tially the same as that of a Project Manager in that he is the primary
executive responsible for overall management of a weapon system.
However, the scope of his authority is primarily limited to logistics
management and support of an operational system in the Fleet. A
serious limitation to his authority is that he does not have financial
control over funds budgeted for his project. The Weapon Systems
Manager also does not have AIRTASK sign-off authority although he
is responsible for planning and executing efforts at various Field
Activities in support of his program (such as test and evaluation
programs) which are normally directed by AIRTASK.
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c. Formal Mechanisms (SOP) for Planning and Goal Setting
These mechanisms for the Pre-Production and Production
Phases are defined in the project charter and in various DOD Component
Directives and Instructions. OMB Circular No. A- 109 has recently made
significant changes to the formalized systems acquisition process. Some
examples of these formal mechanisms are: Planning, Programming,
Budgeting System (PPBS) related documents such as JSOP, JFM, POM;
and other important mechanisms such as: DCP, DSARC/NSARC, WSPD,
ASPR, and Carrier Deployment Schedules.
During the Out-of-Production Phase, the formal planning
mechanisms are mostly defined in DOD Component Directives and
Instructions. The POM, WSPD, and Carrier Deployment Schedules
are still important planning documents for this phase. One of the more
important planning documents for the Out-of-Production weapon systems
is the Integrated Logistics Support Plan (ILSP).
Other less formal planning mechanisms frequently used
during all phases of the project include instruments such as Transition
Agreements and Memorandums of Understanding.
d. Reward and Incentive Criteria
These include fitness reports for military officers assigned
to the project and performance evaluations for civilian employees. The
fitness report of the Project Manager is normally signed by the Com-
mander of the Naval Air Systems Command and those of his staff by the
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Project Manager himself. Once the project has been assigned to a
Field Activity, the designated Weapon Systems Manager receives a
regular fitness report from the Field Activity Commanding Officer.
However, the practice of providing a concurrent fitness report from
NAVAIRSYSCOM (AIR-04) in accordance with NAVAIRINST 5400.70 has
been terminated. This tends to create problems when there are conflicts
between program priorities and those of the Field Activity to which the
Weapon Systems Manager is assigned. When this happens, the Weapon
Systems Manager ceases to manage his program in an objective manner
since the priorities established by the Field Activity Commanding Officer
are not necessarily congruent with program requirements.
One problem typical of a matrix organization is that indi-
vidual fitness reports and performance evaluation for Participating
Managers in the functional areas are normally appraised within the
functional groups rather than by the Project Manager whom they support.
Current plans, however, are to include the Project Manager in the per-
formance evaluation process.
An interesting concept to note is the incentive criteria
that a Project Manager has to maximize his budget rather than to
minimize it. Because of the highly competitive system for justifying
project funds, no Project Manager ever gets rewarded for minimizing
his budget. His rewards do come however, from all of the good things
that he can do for the project such as meeting critical project milestones,

minimizing basic design and logistics problems to improve systems
readiness, and maximizing the number of performance and reliability-
improvement changes. All of these things are obviously easier to
accomplish with a large budget,
e. Physical Location
During the Pre-Production and Production Phases, the
project office is normally located at NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ, which is in
the greater Washington DC area. This is important because the majority
of agencies that the project office frequently interacts with are also con-
venient to the Washington area. For example, it is not uncommon for
the Project Manager and his staff to be called to the Pentagon several
times in one day for budget meetings. In addition, many of the func-
tional managers on the project team are centrally located in Washington,
although this pattern is recently changing with the emphasis on relocating
many support groups to Field Activities.
During the Out-of-Production Phase, the project is assigned
to a Weapon Systems Manager and physically located at a Field Activity
such as a Naval Air Rework Facility (NARF). The choice of the location
is usually an extension of an earlier one to designate the same Facility
as the Cognizant Field Activity (CFA) for basic design and maintenance
engineering responsibility. Frequently, the same Facility will also be
the prime Designated Overhaul Point (DOP) for the weapon system.
Since the majority of problems on out-of-production weapon systems
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are logistics in nature, project management is enhanced by centrally-
locating the WSM, CFA and DOP at the same Field Activity.
f. Personnel Policies
Navy military officers are normally relocated every two or
three years in most Commands. This obviously can be a disruption and
loss of continuity to a project, especially if allowed to occur during a
critical phase. For this reason, it is frequent policy for Project Managers
and their military staff to serve extended tours while assigned to a
project. In addition, the Weapon Systems Acquisition Management
(WSAM) Program, as defined in BUPERSINST 1040. 2, establishes for-
malized training and selection criteria for military project personnel.
Also, DOD Directive 5000. 1 addresses the assignment and tenure of
Project Managers by requiring career incentives be established to
attract, retain, motivate, and reward competent Project Managers.
Changes in Project Managers are not supposed to be made prior to
Milestone I or during full-scale engineering development prior to the
Milestone III decision, except by specific action of higher authority.
The WSAM Program and DOD Directive 5000. 1 do not address civilian
or Model Management personnel.
4. Task Attributes
a. Goal Orientation
The Project Manager's primary mission is to provide to
the operating forces of the Navy fully supported weapon systems which

will satisfy approved operational requirements. The scope of the projects
consists of concept formulation, contract definition, development, test
and evaluation, acquisition, and initial support of the weapon system.
This includes subsystems and components, spares, repair parts, special
and general support equipment, weapon system trainer s /flight simulators,
and all supporting technical documentation. These requirements are
clearly identified in the project charter and in various DOD Component
Directives and Instructions.
After the weapon systems have been deployed in the Fleet,
the primary mission of the project is maintaining aircraft readiness.
Some time after the project office has been disestablished,
a Weapon Systems Manager is designated at a Field Activity. The WSM
is the principal advisor, consultant, and manager of the weapon system
for the Commander of NAVAIRSYSCOM. He is responsible for overall
management of the weapon system to satisfy requirements of CNO and
the Fleet. He also serves as a point of contact and acts in an advisory
capacity to other services, agencies, and foreign governments. This
includes management responsibilities for: planning and execution of
total systems integration; design and maintenance engineering; modifica-
tions and improvements; maintenance and rework; testing and evaluation;
configuration control; material acquisition; contracting; coordination of
interservice programs; and logistics support to the Fleet in the areas
of spares and repair parts, rework programs, training, facilities,

PGSE, contractor or Navy technical services, and technical documenta-
tion. These requirements are defined in NAVAIRINST 5400. 70.
Another important task of Project and Weapon Systems
Management is in the Foreign Military Sales Program where manage-
ment services of systems acquisition and integrated logistics support
are provided to a foreign government in very much the same or similar
fashion that services to our own Government are provided.
b. Risk and Uncertain Events
The task of project management is one of risk and uncer-
tainty to which the project team must continually respond. For example,
during the Pre-Production Phase, the project is faced with the uncertain-
ties of research and design development; test and evaluation; safety,
reliability, maintainability considerations as related to basic design;
and the continually changing strategies from higher authority concerning
program requirements such as aircraft procurement numbers and con-
figuration requirements.
During the Production Phase, the project is faced with the
new uncertainties of contract performance and initial Fleet introduction.
During the Out-of-Production Phase, the uncertain aspects
of maintainability and reliability and their impact on systems readiness
must be addressed.
c. Time Horizon
One aspect of the project management task that significantly
complicates the planning problem is the requirement to meet fixed
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deadlines regardless of continually changing program inputs. For
example, once the decision is made from higher authority regarding a
specific carrier configuration and deployment date, an all out effort
must be made to meet that deadline. When unforeseen problems or
changes in the program occur, compressed schedules and work.-arounds
must be generated in order to provide the required support to the carrier
when it deploys. The Project Manager is responsible for providing
urgent response to Fleet problems, briefings to higher echelons, pro-
gram justification, and, of course, any crisis involving National Defense
concerning his project. The above is true for all phases of the project.
d. Environmental Interaction
Figure 4-2 is a survey of the main agencies and groups
that interact with the Project or Weapon System Manager, his staff,
and team members in performing their task. The list includes, but is
not limited to: upper DOD echelons such as CNM, CNO, SECNAV,
SECDEF, OMB; various Field Activities such as the Laboratories,
Test and Evaluation Facilities and Naval Air Rework Facilities; Con-
gressional Committees; Contractors; other System Commands; and
the Fleet.
e. Highly Complex Tasks
When one considers the large number of agencies and
outside influences the project office must constantly interact with (refer
to figure 4-2), the multitude of organizational requirements, and
73

resulting variables that are part of the bureaucratic government system,
the task of managing the project can only be classified as highly complex.
Although the nature of the tasks change as the system evolves through
its life cycle, the complexity of the tasks do not.
f. High Technology
The technology involved in the project management task
should also be classified as advanced and rapidly changing, especially
in the Electronics and Aerospace fields. Even on older out-of-production
weapon systems, the requirement to retrofit with more modern compon-
ents involves new technology.
g. Specialized Knowledges and Skills
Because of the advanced technology involved, the task of
managing a weapon system requires specialized knowledges and skills.
These include basic engineering fields such as Aeronautical, Mechanical,
Electrical, Electronic, and Industrial Engineering. In addition, advanced
knowledges and skills in Systems Acquisition and Logistics Management
are required.
5. Informal Social System
a. Informal Leadership
This includes the individual leadership abilities of the
Project Manager and his staff. In a matrix organization, the success
of a project is greatly dependent on informal leadership ability since
administrative control over project team members is retained in the
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functional groups. This is true of all three life-cycle phases. However,
as the project grows older, informal leadership abilities become increas-
ingly more important since the project usually has to compete with newer
projects with higher priority. This is especially true in the Out-of-
Production Phase after the project office has been disestablished and
the program management has been assigned to a Weapon Systems
Manager at a Field Activity.
b. Project Cohesion
Project cohesion is also of paramount importance to the
success of a matrix organization for the same reasons given for leader-
ship ability. During the Pre-Production and Production Phases, project
cohesion is normally fairly good because the project office controls and
directs project funds, and because of the importance and priority
assigned to the project. Attempts to maintain project cohesion, however,
become increasingly more difficult as the project ages and has to com-
pete with newer programs.
Project cohesion within the Model Management office is
also fairly good because of its relatively small size and close proximity
of essential program element managers such as the APML and Class
Desk. However, project cohesion between the Model Management office
and the functional support groups at NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ and other Field
Activities is somewhat deficient because of (1) scarcity of program
funding, (2) low program priority, and (3) its remote location from
NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ, which is a recognized source of power and authority.
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c. Informal Status System
The informal status system lends prestige to the Project
Manager and his staff since they are the focal point and coordinate all
aspects of the project. In addition, the Project Manager is normally of
the rank Captain or higher. Project charisma, although difficult to
define, is also very much part of the informal status system. The
above is true primarily during the Pre-Production and Production Phases
while the project office is still in operation.
During the Out-of-Projection Phase, the APML, who is
normally a civilian manager, assumes management of the weapon system
until assigned to a Field Activity. Under the Model Management Pro-
gram, the assigned Weapon Systems Manager has been of the rank
Captain or lower, depending upon the size and relative importance
assigned to the project. There has been a current tendency, however,
to down grade the authority of the program even further by the assign-
ment of junior Commanders or lower as the Weapon Systems Manager.
In addition, program prestige and charisma are generally poor since
most weapon systems assigned to Model Management are older and
out -of -production.
d. Political Alliances and Coalitions
This includes the political alliances between the Project
or Weapon Systems Manager, his staff, and the various members of
groups with which there is interaction (Refer to figure 4-2). Political
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alliances, especially with higher authority, certain Field Activities,
and Fleet Commanders, are very much a part of the informal social
system and can be very important to the success of the project.
During the Pre-Production and Production Phases, political
alliances with selected groups in higher authority, such as OP-506 and
OP-098, are usually fairly strong, and with others, it is varied. The
requirement to maintain these political alliances, however, creates
excessive demands on the Project Manager's time, which often directs
his energies away from managing the project. During the Production
Phase, political alliances with Fleet Commanders and supporting Field
Activities become increasingly more important as the weapon systems
become operational.
During the Out-of-Production Phase, the political alliances
between the Model Management office, Type Commanders, and Field
Activities are normally fairly strong but considerably weakened with
higher authority due to loss of program priority on older out-of-production
systems.
6. Human Dimensions
a. Experience and Educational Levels
One of the previously defined Task Attributes of Weapon
Systems Management was Specialized Knowledges and Skills. The
Project Manager, his staff, and most team members normally have
had specialized training and/or experience in one or more of the basic
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technical fields. Some members assigned to the project, although
normally not many, have also had advance training and extensive
experience in Systems Acquisition and Logistics Management. This is
not nearly as true, however, for the Model Management staff unless
experienced project management personnel from NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ
are transferred to the Field Activity along with the program. The
Weapon Systems Acquisition Management (WSAM) Program, as defined
in BUPERSINST 1040. 2, establishes formalized training and selection
criteria for military project personnel. No similar type program for
civilian personnel, however, has been established to date.
b. Other Human Dimensions
Other human dimensions in which there is wide variation
among project management personnel include: inherent motivation,
personality factors, management styles, use of power, personal needs
and interest, individual beliefs and values, individual attitudes and
cultural conditioning. There are certain traits, however, that tend to
favor a project management environment. For example, successful
Project Managers are normally highly motivated and their management
styles compatible with a matrix type organization.
Recent studies on profile abilities necessary for successful
Project Management include the following [Cours].
Ability to identify problems
Overall high communications skills ability
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Ability to think imaginatively
Ability to think in the broadest range possible
Technical ability to analyze complex problems
High ability in interpersonal relations
Ability to interface with high ranking officers
and officials
Ability to write well and present complex issues clearly
Ability to brief frequently and well
High persuasion abilities




After examining the organizational definition of the three life-
cycle phases of weapon systems management, as described by the appli-
cation of the Systems Analysis Model in Section IV, it became apparent
that there are two distinct management organizations, (1) Project
Management, and (2) Model Management. The Pre-Production and
Production Phases are supported by the Project Management organiza-
tion, and the majority of the Out-of-Production Phase is supported by
the Model Management organization. The transition period between
Project Management and Model Management, during which time the
program is being managed by the APML, is actually an extension of
the initial Fleet logistics support aspect of Project Management and
was not considered separately.
The following paragraphs in this Section consider Project Manage-
ment and Model Management as two separate and distinct organizations.
A review of the operational requirements of both organizations and
their abilities and assets was made. In addition, a review of reported
organizational problems and those elements considered essential for
effective weapon systems management was also made. Finally, an
evaluation was made based on information presented in this Section
discussing the adequacy of Project and Model Management to accomplish

their operational requirements. Figure 3-1 presented a flowchart
showing the method of evaluating the Project and Model Management
organizations. Resulting conclusions concerning the adequacy of Project
and Model Management to accomplish their organizational requirements
are summarized in Section VI.
A. EVALUATION OF PROJECT MANAGEMENT
1 . First Step : Review of Project Management Organizational
Characteristics
As illustrated in figure 3-1, the first step in evaluating the
organization was a review of its (a) Operational Requirements, and (b)
Abilities and Assets. This information was presented in detail in
Section IV, Organizational Definition, and is summarized for quick
reference in table format as follows:
a. Operational Requirements
(1) Mission/Goals (Refer to Table 5-1)
(2) Responsibilities (Refer to Table 5-1)
(3) Other Requirements (Refer to Table 5-1)
b. Abilities and Assets
(1) Inputs (Refer to Table 5-2)
(2) Outputs (Refer to Table 5-3)
(3) Organizational Variables (Refer to Table 5-4)
(4) Informal Social System (Refer to Table 5-5)
(5) Human Dimensions (Refer to Table 5-6)

TABLE 5-1





The Project Manager's primary mission is to pro-
vide to the operating forces of the Navy fully sup-
ported weapon systems which will satisfy approved








The Project Manager must oversee all efforts to
acquire, deploy, operate, and support the weapon





Define and maintain organizational relation-
ships and responsibilities
Establish firm and realistic weapon system
and equipment specifications.
Identify high-risk areas.
Explore schedule, cost, and technical per-
formance trade-off decisions
.
Select the best technical approaches.
Establish firm and realistic schedules and
cost estimates.
Formulate realistic logistics support and
operational concepts.




TABLE 5-1 (cont. )








Coordinate interface segments of project with other
groups, Commands, etc.
Maintain liaison with cognizant NMC staff regarding
status and progress of project.
Furnish to all participating organizations current
information on project plans and proposed changes.
Keep BUPERS informed of military personnel
reqmts.
Maintain continuing review of:
Operational requirements, inventory objec-
tives, schedules, and funding availability.
ILS planning and implementation.
Acquisition of facilities for T&cE installation,
operation, and maintenance, for the weapon system
Maintain liaison with cognizant personnel at T&E
Activities and ensure readiness of system for
OPEVAL and/or Fleet use.
Head team of members from functional groups of
NAVAIR and ensure their support.
Direct procurement of test, SSE, technical docu-
mentation, trainers, and provide concurrence for
budgetary submissions for ILS on these items.
Monitor contractor test and demonstrations.
Identify personnel support requirements, training,
etc., for BIS, OPTEVFOR, Fleet, Training Com-
mand, NARF's, etc.
Provide overall direction for procurement of main-
tenance and operator trainers and equipment.










Fixed deadlines such as carrier deployments
Compressed schedules and work-arounds
Urgent Fleet problems






Upper DOD echelons: CNM, CNO, SECNAV,
SECDEF, OMB








(Ref. IV. B.4. e)
Interaction with large number of Agencies and
outside influences
Multitude of organizational requirements and




Advanced and rapidly changing, especially in






Basic Engineering Fields: Aeronautical, Mechani-
cal, Electrical, Electronics, Industrial
Advanced knowledges and skills in Systems
Acquisition and Logisitics Management

TABLE 5-2
REVIEW OF PROJECT MANAGEMENT ABILITIES AND ASSETS
INPUTS DESCRIPTION
RESOURCES People (Typical Project)
(Ref: IV. B. l.a)
Project Manager
Deputy for Fiscal Control and assistants
Deputy for Planning and assistants
Deputy for Air Vehicles and assistants
Deputy for Weapons and assistants
Deputy for Logistics Support and assistants










TABLE 5-2 (cont. )
REVIEW OF PROJECT MANAGEMENT ABILITIES AND ASSETS
INPUTS DESCRIPTION
RESOURCES
(Ref: IV. B. l.a Funding
Project Manager has budgetary control over
RDT&E and APN- 1 (or WPN) funds.
Project Manager does not have budgetary-
control over out-of-production funds
(APN-5/OSIP, APN-6, APN-7, and O&MN).
Out-of-production (logistics support) funds
are managed by functional groups in NAVAIR













(Ref: IV. B. l.b)
Primarily direction from higher authority
Project Charter (mission, authority, and
responsibilities)
Initial support - ILS Plan
DOD Component Directives and Instructions
CNO strategies, Carrier Deployment Schedules,
and Weapon System Planning Document (WSPD)
Congressional strategies
Personal Project Manager strategies
INFORMATION
(Ref: IV. B. l.c)
Management Information Systems:
3M data, UR's, RISE, Contract Progress
Reports, Cost/Schedule Control Systems
Reports: Test, performance & field reports
Meetings & conferences:
Congressional committee meetings & briefings
DSARC/NSARC
ILS meetings

















Project Office is responsible for planning,
programming, and reprogramming project
funds;
Budget justification, execution, and control.
Out-of-production funds managed by functional
groups in NAVAIR.
Weapon System Design Performance
BIS trials/Approval for service use
Operation, Maintainability and Reliability








Size and Rank of Project Staff
Rank of Project Manager and staff increases
with size and importance of project.












Matrix Organization - depend on functional areas
to carry-out project requirements.
Project Manager's position established within




Defined in SECNAVINST 5000. 1 and Project
Charter.
Program Manager is single central executive
responsible for successful management of project
toward accomplishment of its objectives. He has
broad directive authority over project planning,
direction, control, and resource utilization.
Authority is normally well recognized.








Defined in Project Charter and various DOD
component directives and instructions
(as revised by OMB Circular A-109).
Examples :
Joint Strategic Objective Plan (JSOP)
Joint Force Memorandum (JFM)
Program Objective Memorandum (POM)
Decision Coordinating Paper (DCP)
Defence (Navy) Systems Acquisition Review
Council (DSARC/NSARC)
Weapon Systems Planning Document (WSPD)
Carrier Deployment Schedules
Arm Services Procurement Regulations (ASPR)
Integrated Logistics Support Plan (ILSP)
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TABLE 5-4 (cont. )







(Ref: IV. B. 3. d)
DESCRIPTION
Fitness reports for Project Manager are signed by
COMNAVAIRSYSCOM. Project staff fitness
reports are signed by the Project Manager.
Performance evaluations for civilian employees.
Plans underway to allow Project Manager to
participate in fitness reports and performance
evaluations of personnel in functional support
groups assigned to project.
Informal appraisal from higher authority and
Fleet Commanders regarding project performance:
Successful accomplishment of DSARC/NSARC
milestones.
Ability to promote and defend project.
Budgetary control over project cost.
Overall systems readiness for operational sys.
PHYSICAL
LOCATION
(Ref: IV. B. 3. e]
Project office is located at NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ,
Wash. DC




(Ref: IV. B. 3.f)
BUPERSINST 1040.2 (WSAM Program) established
formal training and selection criteria for military
Systems Acquisition personnel.
DOD Directive 5000. 1 addresses assignment and
tenure of Project Managers.
No similar programs for civilian Systems












(Ref: IV. B. 5. a)
Informal leadership ability (should be) considered
in selection of project management personnel since
it is an important requirement to management of a
weapon system in a matrix organization.
PROJECT
COHESION
(Ref: IV. B. 5. b. )
Normally good during Pre-Production Phase and
early part of Production Phase due to project
priority and control of RDT&E and new procure-
ment funds.
More difficult to maintain toward latter part of
Production Phase as project becomes older and
must compete with newer projects. Also, Project





(Ref: IV. B. 5. c)
Prestige and charisma normally good on new
projects since Program Manager and staff are
focal points and coordinate all aspects of project.





(Ref: IV. B. 5. d)
Strong alliance between Project Manager and
higher authority during Pre-Production and
Production Phases.
Alliance with Fleet Commanders becomes more
important during Production Phase.












Specialized training and experience in basic tech-
nical fields is normally required for Project
Manager, staff, and team members.
Advance training and experience in Systems
Acquisition and Logistics Management is
infrequent.
WSAM Program establishes career development
standards for military personnel in Systems
Acquisition Management.
No career development program for civilians in









(Ref: IV. B. b.b)






2. Second Step : Review of Reported Project Management Problems
As illustrated in figure 3-1, the second step in evaluating the
organization was a review of reported problems.
Appendix B contains a list of management problems reported
from interviewing numerous Project and Model Management personnel.
Many of the problem statements are the result of inputs from several
individuals and most are the result of more than one input. Problems
pertinent to Project Management are grouped and listed below for
reference.
a. Problems Affecting Overall Project Effectiveness
(1) Micro -Management from higher authority.
(2) Excessive demands on Project Manager and staff's
time for briefs and pre-briefs to higher authority.
(3) Extensive paperwork, documentation, DCP's, test
plans, and details for higher authority
(4) Lack of adequate project support and funding from
higher authority.
(5) Conflicting and frequently changing requirements
from higher authority
(6) Budget changes by Congress, NAVCOMP, and OMB
have severe impact on project and increase out-year
costs.
(7) Budget cycle is inflexible. Budget cycles and project
cycles are out-of-synch.
(8) General requirement to not be completely honest in
order to get things done and keep project moving.
(9) Continually diminishing engineering and logistics
talent. Due to lack of sufficient personnel, never




(10) Lack of qualified personnel in engineering and logistics
functional areas.
(11) Slow command response to personnel requirements.
b. Problems related to Integrated Logistics Support
(1) Project funds on many projects are directed to
Participating Managers in the functional groups
bypassing the APML who has the lead ILS responsibility.
(2) Lack of flexibility with funding due to different appro-
priation categories (APN-1, APN-5, APN-6, APN-7,
O&MN, etc. )
(3) Project Manager has no control over O&MN funds
allocated to support his project.
c. General Management Problems
(1) Lack of proper communications and coordination
between project office and project team members in
functional areas. Also, between other project managers
on common equipments.
(2) Uncertainty of organizational elements in support of
project.
(3) Need better definition of project responsibilities,
authority, and interrelationship.
(4) More authority and responsibility is needed over
individuals assigned to functional groups.
(5) Difficult to generate team spirit in matrix organization.
(6) Individual and parochial interest and general lack of
overall motivation interferes with project interest.
(7) Lack of career development and promotional oppor-
tunities for civilian staff within the project office.
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3. Third Step : Review of Essential Elements to Effective Project
Management
As illustrated in figure 3-1, the third step in evaluating the
organization was a review of elements considered essential to effective
Project Management.
Appendix C contains the results of an evaluation to determine
those elements considered essential to effective program management.
A proposed list of elements was presented to experienced Project and
Model Management personnel during an interview. They were asked
to revise the list as required, and then rank them in order of significance.
Project Management involves the management of a weapon system during
the Pre-Production and Production Phases of its life cycle. The weighted
average results from those projects managing the Pre-Production or
Production Phases of a weapon system is listed below in ranked order
of significance starting with the most essential element.
ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS TO
RANK EFFECTIVE PROJECT MANAGEMENT
1 Availability of funding to project
2 Control of project funding
3 Good project management talent
4 Clearly defined and recognized authority
5 Availability of good engineering and logistics talent
6 Project priority
7 Good working relationship with CNO and Fleet Commanders
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8 Good working relationship with contractor
9 Good management information systems
10 Availability of travel funds
4. Fourth Step : Determination of Project Management
Organizational Adequacy
As illustrated in figure 3-1, the fourth and last step in evaluat-
ing the organization was a determination of the adequacy of Project
Management to accomplish its operational requirements.
A thorough review of the abilities and assets of Project Manage-
ment in Tables 5-2 through 5-6 indicates that there are many good
features about the organization as well as deficiencies. However,
there are many influences in the Project Management environment, both
internal and external that significantly impact its effectiveness. Further
review of the reported organizational problems and those elements
considered essential for effective Project Management presented earlier
in Sections V. A. 2 and V.A.3 provide key insight and tend to substantiate
the results of the following evaluation. Appropriate reference para-
graphs and tables are shown in parenthesis.
a. Good Features of Project Management
Within NAVAIRSYSCOM, Project Management provides a
centralized and dedicated management organization for integrating the
diverse functional activities of RDT&cE, procurement, and initial
deployments of a complex weapon system.
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Project Management within the Navy uses a matrix organiza.
tion (Table 5-4, Structure). This is in contrast to the organizational
structures of Project Management in the Air Force, which uses a self-
contained project office, and the Army, which uses a combination of the
two. Where there are a large number of projects involved, which is the
case within the Navy, the total number of people required to support a
matrix organization is significantly lower than that of the self-contained
project. For example, Fox reports that while the Navy had 14 people
staffed in the F-14 project office and another 92 people assigned to the
F-14 project from the functional areas within NAVAIRSYSCOM, the Air
Force had 243 people assigned to the self-contained F-15 project office
[Fox, p. 171]. Furthermore, it has been observed and reported that
in organizations that use self-contained project offices, the best tech-
nical and managerial talent, and other resources tend to become quickly
concentrated in the projects with the highest priority, leaving the other
projects deficient. This is obviously a disadvantage where there are
multiple projects to be supported. Therefore, the matrix organizational
structure utilized by NAVAIRSYSCOM Project Management provides an
efficient use of scarce personnel resources where there are a large
number of complex projects to support .
Another important aspect to consider is the organization's
capability to maintain project control over its key operational require-
ments. A review of the abilities and assets of Project Management in
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Tables 5-2 through 5-6 indicates that overall project control in most
areas other than logistics support is adequate . The degree of project
control is directly related to those areas over which there is control of
funds. There obviously are many other factors that also affect project
control both directly and indirectly, but in a highly competitive environ-
ment where project funds are scarce, budgetary control is imperative
to effective project control. This attitude is shared by almost all
Project Managers who ranked control of project funds second only to
availability of funds among those elements considered essential to effec-
tive project management (V.A. 3).
Further review of the abilities and assets of Project
Management indicate that there are many more good features of lesser
significance when considered individually, but are very important to the
management organization as a whole. However, these tend to be over-
shadowed by the deficiencies in the system.
b. Deficiencies of Project Management
One of the major problems that impacts the overall capa-
bility of most projects to accomplish their mission is the inability of
Project Managers and their staff to perform their most basic function -
to manage! First of all, project personnel readily admit that most
major decisions that affect the progress of the project are made at
higher levels (Table 5-2, Input Strategies and Plans). Secondly, exces-
sive demands are normally made on their time in preparing briefings
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and special studies for higher authority (Table 5-8, Political Alliances).
This situation is reflected in reported comments of "micro -management"
from higher authority, the requirement for briefs and pre-briefs, and
the extensive paperwork and details for higher authority (V.A.2.a).
Third, there is an informal requirement to respond to a multitude of
requests for information from agencies outside of the chain-of-command.
Therefore, overall project effectiveness in accomplishing its mission/
goals is reduced due to erosion of the Project Manager's basic function
to manage the project .
Another problem that reduces overall project effectiveness
is the requirement to continually justify, defend, and sell the project.
In a highly competitive environment, the Project Manager must con-
tinually fight for a larger budget and larger program in order for his
project to survive (Table 5-1, Responsibilities, and Table 5-3,
Productivity). He must sell the program to higher levels of DOD and
Congress regardless of whether he sees the need. In order to do this,
he must actually be somewhat deceptive. This is reflected in reported
comments that there is a general requirement not to be completely
honest in order to get things done and keep the project moving (V.A.2.a).
Also, the Project Manager must protect his budget and prevent funds
from being pulled back once he gets them by committing project funds
as early as possible in the fiscal year, regardless of whether the timing
is right. Therefore, overall project effectiveness in accomplishing its

mission/goals is reduced due to the requirement to continually promote
and defend the project before higher levels of POD and Congress.
One of the more prevalent problem areas reported that
impacts overall project effectiveness relates to the nature of support
and direction received from higher authority. As stated earlier, most
major decisions that affect the progress of the project are made at
higher levels. Because of the highly political environment of Congress
with the influence of political lobbies, etc. , and its interaction with the
upper levels of the Executive Branch and DOD, there is often an apparent
lack of full support and needed funding on many projects. Furthermore,
the requirements passed down from higher authority are often conflict-
ing and frequently changing (V.A. 2. a). For example, Congress may
reduce the planned funding level and number of aircraft to be procured
during a given year while the OPNAV requirement to satisfy critical
milestones related to aircraft carrier deployments remains unchanged.
One of the reported comments reflects this problem by indicating that
budget changes by Congress, NAVCOMP, and OMB have a severe impact
on the project and increase planned out-year costs (V. A. 2. a). These
conditions obviously make it very difficult for the Project Manager and
his staff to plan and effectively manage the project. Therefore, overall
project effectiveness in accomplishing its mission/goals is reduced due
to: lack of adequate project support from higher authority; and conflict -
ing and frequently changing requirements from higher authority .
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Because of the recent trend over the past several years to
decentralize, many functions in the various engineering and logistics
support groups within NAVAIRSYSCOM have been reorganized, consoli-
dated, and/or reassigned to Field Activities. This is obviously a prob-
lem for the project manager and his staff in a matrix organization who
must depend on these groups for timely functional support. For example,
it is not unusual for a Project Manager to be requested to provide a
brief at the Pentagon requiring a technical analysis by the end of the
work day to defend his project (Table 5-1, Time Horizon and Environ-
mental Interaction). Since the previously qualified technical personnel
that he used to depend on for this information are now, in a lot of in-
stances, non-existent or located at a Field Activity, he is at a great
disadvantage. The availability of good engineering and logistics talent
was ranked fifth among those elements considered most essential to
effective project management (V.A.3). One frequent comment from
Project Managers is that due to the lack of sufficient personnel, they
are never able to spend enough time on any given project to do an
adequate job (V.A. 2. a). For this reason, much of the workload
formerly handled within the functional areas at NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ is
contracted-out, which is normally very costly. Furthermore, this
usually makes the Project Manager more dependent upon the contractor
to help promote and defend his project. This is often in direct conflict
with good business practice to maintain an arms length and objective
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relationship with the contractor. Therefore, overall project effective -
ness in accomplishing its mission/goals is reduced due to continually-
diminishing engineering and logistics talent in the functional areas at
NAVAIRSYSCQMHQ.
As discussed in Section IV, one of the Task Attributes of
weapon systems management was Specialized Knowledges and Skills.
Also, among those elements considered essential to effective project
management, good project management talent ranked third (V.A.3).
In order to be an effective and efficient manager, advanced training
and experience in Systems Acquisition and Logistics Management is
essential (Table 5-1, Specialized Knowledges and Skills). However,
there is a problem in obtaining and keeping such qualified personnel.
DOD has attempted to address this problem for military personnel
through the Weapon Systems Acquisition Management (WSAM) program
by establishing standards for career development and advancement of
systems acquisition management personnel. Although there has been
recent concern within DOD about the lack of a similar career develop-
ment program for civilians, there is no established program to date
(Table 5-4, Personnel Policies). Most civilian jobs within the project
office are viewed by many as dead-ended with little chance of promotion.
This is understandable since most of the senior positions within the
project office are normally staffed by military personnel. Therefore,
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overall project effectiveness is reduced due to the problem of obtaining
and keeping highly qualified civilian personnel . This is due to the lack
of career development and promotional opportunities within the project
office .
There are many general problems characteristic of a
matrix organization that reduce overall project effectiveness . Some of
the reported problems indicated a lack of proper communication and
coordination between the project office and team members in the func-
tional areas. There was concern expressed over the uncertainty of
various organizational elements to support the project. The need for
better definition of project responsibilities, authority, and inter-
relationships, and control over individuals assigned to functional groups
was also expressed (V.A. 2. c). Clearly defined and recognized authority
was ranked number four among those elements considered essential to
effective project management (V.A. 3). Some Project Managers expe-
rienced difficulties in generating team spirit and motivation. Although
these problems are typical of a matrix organization, they can be mini-
mized with special attention given to proper management skills and
informal leadership approaches (Table 5-5, Informal Leadership Ability),
One of the good features stated earlier about project man-
agement is that overall project control is adequate in most areas except
logistics support . It was further explained that the degree of project
control is directly related to those areas over which there is control
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of funds. Since control over O&MN funds is normally maintained by
the functional support groups within NAVAIRSYSCOM, the Project
Manager does not control related logistics support areas such as re-
work, contractor maintenance engineering services (CMES), Cognizant
Field Activity (CFA) support, etc. (Table 5-2, Input Resources - funding)
Although the Project Manager does provide inputs to the cognizant budget
manager, his project requirements are considered along with other
projects. Since the Project Manager is not setting the priorities on the
expenditure of O&MN funds, he does not have control. Therefore,
management ability over logistics support is degraded due to lack of
Project Manager control over &MN funds .
Section II defines the Assistant Project Manager, Logistics
(APML), as having lead management responsibility within the functional
groups at NAVAIRSYSCOM for integrated logistics support (Table 5-2,
Input Resources - People). In this capacity, he heads-up a team of
Participating Managers to provide logistics support to operational sys-
tems in the Fleet. It is common practice on many projects, however,
to direct project funds to the Participating Managers on the team com-
pletely bypassing the APML and his control (V. A. 2.b). In such cases,
management ability over logisitics support is degraded due to the prac -
tice of directing project funds to Participating Managers instead of to
the APML who has lead ILS responsibility .
104

The Project Manager's ability to exercise good business
judgement is quite often degraded because of the restrictions placed on
how and when different appropriation categories can be utilized (V.A.2.b),
Although this could apply to all phases of the project, it seems to have its
greatest impact on logistics support where out-of-production support
funds such as APN-5, APN-6, APN-7 (or WPN) and O&MN are scarce
and RDT&tE and new procurement APN-1 (or WPN) funds are available
(Table 5-2, Input Resources - Funding). For example, in the interest
of creating competition, the Project Manager might need the flexibility
of having work performed by a contractor (which normally requires APN
funds) or in-house Navy (which normally requires O&MN funds). Be-
cause the project was originally planned and budgeted around accom-
plishing the work in-house using O&MN funds, he may be forced to
stick with his original plans instead of using a commercial contractor,
even though the contractor is cheaper. Comptrollers within the Govern-
ment are required by law (Section 3678 of Revised Statues - 31 USC 665 -
Anti-Deficiency Act) to ensure that funds are used only for what they
were appropriated. The system could be changed, however, by congres-
sional action. Therefore, management ability over logistics support is
degraded due to lack of flexibility in utilizing different appropriation
categories
Section II defines the Class Desk as having the lead engi-
neering responsibility for basic weapon system design and performance.

Like the APML, the Class Desk engineer normally heads -up his team
of engineers in the functional groups (Table 5-2, Input Resources -
People). It is also common practice on many projects to direct funds
to the Participating Managers on his team completely bypassing the Class
Desk and his control. This is not quite as serious of a management
problem, however, as with the APML since the Class Desk directs
many of his work efforts by AIR TASK which identifies the project order
committing the funds. Although this system alleviates the Class Desk
from the burden of issuing Project Orders, it still prevents him from
exercising full managerial control. Therefore, management ability over
responsibilities related to basic design and performance is degraded
when project funds are directed to Participating Managers instead of to
the Class Desk who has lead engineering responsibility .
B. EVALUATION OF MODEL MANAGEMENT
1. First Step : Review of Model Management Organizational
Characteristics
As illustrated in figure 3-1, the first step in evaluating the
organization was a review of its (a) Operational Requirements, and
(b) Abilities and Assets. This information was presented in detail in
Section IV, Organizational Definition, and is summarized for quick
reference in table format as follows:
a. Operational Requirements
(1) Mission/Goals (Refer to Table 5-7)








(Ref: IV. B. 4. a)
The WSM is the principal advisor , consultant , and
manager of the weapon system for COMNAVAIR.




(Ref: IV. B. 4. a.
Planning and executing total systems integration














contractor or Navy technical services
technical documentation









(Ref: IV. B. 4. c)
Fixed deadlines such as carrier deployments
Compressed schedules and work-arounds
Urgent Fleet problems





(Ref: IV. B. 4. d)
Upper DOD echelons: CNM, CNO, SECNAV,
SECDEF, OMB








(Ref: IV. B. 4. e)
Interaction with large number of Agencies and
outside influences
Multitude of organizational requirements and
variables in bureaucratic system
HIGH
TECHNOLOGY
(Ref: IV. B. 4. f)
Advanced and rapidly changing, especially in





(Ref: IV. B. 4. g)
Basic Engineering Fields: Aeronautical,
Mechanical, Electrical, Electronics,
Industrial
Advanced knowledges and skills in Systems
Acquisition and Logistics Management

TABLE 5-8
REVIEW OF MODEL MANAGEMENT ABILITIES AND ASSETS
INPUTS DESCRIPTION
RESOURCES




Class Desk or equivalent
APML or equivalent
Contracting Officer (at NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ)
Comptroller (at NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ)
Specialized Engineering &c Logistics Managers





No control over any funds
Scarcity of available funds (OSIP/O&MN)






TABLE 5-8 (cont. )





(Ref: IV. B. l.b)
Primarily direction from higher authority-
Model Management Instruction, NAVAIRINST
5400. 70, promulgates formal policy that reserves
authority for planning, programming, and
budgeting and depot workload control to functional
managers within NAVAIR.
Integrated logistics support plan
DO D Component Directives & Instructions
CNO Strategies, Carrier Deployment





(Ref: IV. B. 1. c)
Management Information Systems:
3M data, UR's, RISE
Reports: Test, performance & field reports









(Ref: IV. B. 2. a)
Accomplishing Milestones
Integrated Logistics Support (ILS)
Retrofit programs
Service Life Extension Programs (SLEP)
Budget Management
Out-of-production funds managed by-
functional groups in NAVAIR.
Weapon System Design Performance
Operation, Maintainability, and Reliability
Weapon System Readiness (Logistics Support)
Integrated Logistics Support
Dependent upon: responsiveness to Fleet prob-
lems, material support, technical manual sup^
port, support equipment, aircraft and com-
ponent rework, maintenance engineering
support, and shipboard interface support.
PROJECT
DEVELOPMENT
(Ref: IV. B. 2.b)
Actual Expenditures
Operational Safety Improvement Program
fOSlP) funds.
Service Life Extension Program (SLEP)
using Conversion in Lieu of Procurement
(CILOP) funds.
Size and Rank of Project Staff
Varies with size and importance of program,
and also upon Weapon Systems Manager's









(Ref: IV. B. 3. a)
Matrix organization. Depend on functional areas
to carry-out program requirements.
WSM and staff are administratively assigned to
Field Activity Command.
WSM and staff are functionally assigned to
COMNAVAIRSYSCOM via AIR-04.




Defined in NAVAIRINST 5400. 70.
WSM is primary executive responsible for overall
management of a weapon system.
Authority is not fully recognized by all groups.
Authority scope primarily limited to logistics
management k support of operational systems in
Fleet.
Authority Limitation: Non-Control over funds
budgeted for project.






(Ref: IV. B. 3. c)





Integrated Logistics Support Plan
ASPR

TABLE 5-10 (cont. )







(Ref: IV. B. 3. d)
Fitness reports for WSM are signed by Field Activ-
ity Commanding Officer.
Loss in program management objectivity occurs
when Field Activity and program priorities conflict,
Civilian employees receive performance
evaluations.
WSM does not participate in fitness reports and
performance evaluations of personnel in functional
support groups.
Informal appraisal from Fleet Commanders regard
ing WSM performance:
Meeting critical project milestones.
Minimizing design and logistics problems.
Overall systems readiness.




(Ref: IV. B. 3. e)
Model Management office located at Field Activity
such as NARF.
DOP and CFA is normally located at same Activity.
Many functional support groups located at
NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ and other Field Activities.
Program management is enhanced by centrally
locating WSM, CFA, and DOP at same Activity
since majority of problems logistic in nature.
PERSONNEL
POLICIES
(Ref: IV. B. 3. f)
No formalized programs or DOD directives address
ing personnel policy for Model Management such as










(Ref: IV. B. 5. a)
Informal leadership ability (should be) considered
in selection of model management personnel since
important requirement to management of out-of-
production system in matrix organization.
PROJECT
COHESION
(Ref: IV. B. 5.b)
Good within Model Management Office.
Poor with respect to NAVAIRSYSCOM functional




(Ref: IV. B. 5. c)
Program prestige and charisma poor due to older
out-of-production systems.
Increasing tendency to down-grade program
authority by assignment of Junior Commanders





(Ref: IV. B. 5. d)
Strong alliance between WSM & Type Commanders.
Weak alliance between WSM & Field Activities.
Weak alliance between WSM & Higher Authority.

TABLE 5-12






(Ref: IV. B. 6. a)
Specialized training and experience in basic
technical fields is normally required for WSM,
staff, and team members.
Advance training and experience in Systems
Acquisition and Logistics Management is
infrequent.
WSAM program establishes career development
standards for military personnel in Systems
Acquisition Management. There is no similar








(Ref: IV. B. 6.b)





(3) Other Requirements (Refer to Table 5-7)
b. Abilities and Assets
(1) Inputs (Refer to Table 5-8)
(2) Outputs (Refer to Table 5-9)
(3) Organizational Variables (Refer to Table 5-10)
(4) Informal Social System (Refer to Table 5-11)
(5) Human Dimensions (Refer to Table 5-12)
2. Second Step : Review of Reported Model Management Problems
As illustrated in figure 3-1, the second step in evaluating the
organization was a review of reported problems.
Appendix B contains a list of management problems reported
from interviewing numerous Project and Model Management personnel.
Many of the problem statements are the result of inputs from several
individuals and most are the result of more than one input. Problems
pertinent to Model Management are grouped and listed below for reference.
a. Problems Related to Program Control
(1) Need for better definition of Weapon Systems Manager's
responsibility, authority, and interrelationships.
(2) Weapon Systems Manager's responsibilities are not
fully supported by NAVAIRSYSCOM - responsibilities
exceed authority.
(3) Program decisions made by functional groups are not
coordinated with the Weapon Systems Manager.
(4) Lack of functional and Field Activity support for old
aircraft.




b. Problems Related to Integrated Logistics Support (ILS)
(1) Lack of adequate funds to Weapon Systems Manager
for engineering and logistics support of older aircraft.
(2) Non-control of available funds by Weapon Systems
Manager.
3. Third Step : Review of Essential Elements to Effective Model
Management
As illustrated in figure 3-1, the third step in evaluating the
organization was a review of elements considered essential to effective
Model Management.
Appendix C contains the results of an evaluation to determine
those elements considered essential to effective program management.
A proposed list of elements was presented to experienced Project and
Model Management personnel during an interview. They were asked
to revise the list as required, and then rank them in order of significance.
Some project offices manage both in-production and out-of-production
weapon systems, and their inputs have also been included along with
those for Model Management since the requirements essential for effec-
tive management of out-of-production systems are considered the same
as for Model Management. The weighted average results from those
programs supporting out-of-production weapon systems is listed below




RANK EFFECTIVE MODEL MANAGEMENT
1 Clearly defined and recognized authority
2 Availability of funding to program
3 Control of program funding
4 Availability of good engineering and logistics talent
5 Good program management talent
6 Program priority
7 Good working relationship with CNO and Fleet
Commanders
8 Good management information system
9 Good working relationship with contractor
10 Availability of travel funds
4. Fourth Step : Determination of Model Management Organizational
Adequacy
As illustrated in figure 3-1, the fourth and last step in eval-
uating the organization was a determination of the adequacy of Model
Management to accomplish its operational requirements.
A thorough review of the abilities and assets of the Model
Management Program presented in Tables 5-8 through 5-12 indicates
that there are both good features as well as deficiencies in the
organization. Further review of the reported organizational problems
and those elements considered essential for effective Model Management
presented earlier in Sections V. B. 2 and V. B. 3 tend to substantiate the

results of the following evaluation. Appropriate reference paragraphs
and tables are shown in parenthesis.
a. Good Features of Model Management
One of the strong points of Model Management is its internal
project cohesion among staff members within the Model Management
office (Table 5-11, Project Cohesion). Because of its relatively small
size and close proximity of essential managers, such as the APML and
Class Desk, a centralized and dedicated effort is provided toward the
support of an out-of-production weapon system . Also, because of the
Model Management's physical location at or near the same Facility as
the Designated Overhaul Point (DOP) and Cognizant Field Activity (CFA),
a more coordinated effort to provide timely solutions to Fleet problems
is possible (Table 5-10, Physical Location). Therefore, response to
Fleet reported problems is facilitated due to colocation of Model Manage -
ment Office and key logistic support groups (CFA and DOP) . Logistic
support to the Fleet is also enhanced by the relatively strong political
alliances that tend to develop between the Weapon Systems Manager, his
staff, and Type Commanders (Table 5-11, Political Alliances). Further
review of the abilities and assets in Tables 5-8 through 5-12 indicate
that there are many more good features of lesser significance when
considered individually, but are very important to the management
organization as a whole. However, these tend to be overshadowed by
the deficiencies in the program.

b. Deficiencies of Model Management
One of the most serious deficiencies in the Model Manage-
ment Organization that tends to impact all areas of responsibility is the
lack of control over any program funds (Table 5-8, Input Resources -
Funding). This deficiency was also one of the reported problems
(V. B.2.a) and was ranked third from the most significant elements
considered essential to effective program management (V. B. 3). Current
NAVAIR policy reserves authority for planning, programming, and
budgeting and depot workload control to the functional managers within
NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ (Table 5-8, Input Strategies and Plans). Program
funds for support of out-of-production aircraft are therefore budgeted
and managed within the functional support groups. This includes APN-5,
APN-6, APN-7 (or WPN) and O&MN appropriations. Since these funds
are budgeted for the support of all out-of-production systems, those
programs given the highest priority normally get the majority of funds.
It should be emphasized that whoever controls the budget is almost always
in the best position to interpret and establish priorities on how the funds
are expended. Therefore, overall program control by the Weapon Sys -
tems Manager is inadequate due to lack of control over any funds
.
Furthermore, management ability over an integrated logistics support
program is significantly degraded due to lack of funding control.
Although the Weapon Systems Manager is required to pro-
vide budgetary inputs to NAVAIR regarding his program requirements

for the next year, funds for out-of-production systems are scarce and,
more often than not, are not approved by CNO. Since the Weapon Systems
Manager does not have his own operating budget around which he can plan,
program, and manage (and also justify and defend when required), he can
not depend on funds being available when needed to support his operational
requirements. The lack of adequate funds for engineering and logistics
support of older aircraft was one of the reported problems (V. B. 2.b).
Also, the availability of funding to the program ranked second among
those elements considered essential to effective Model Management
(V.B.3). Fleet Logistics support is therefore severely restricted due to
lack of available funds when needed.
Another serious deficiency that impacts overall program
control is in the area of recognized program authority and responsibilities
There is a general tendency within NAVAIR, various Field Activities,
and CNO, to not recognize the authority and assigned responsibilities of
the Weapon Systems Manager regarding the total program (Table 5-10,
Authority, and Table 5-7, Responsibilities). This further generates
the tendency for the functional support groups to not coordinate their
decisions with the Weapon Systems Manager, even though their decisions
may have an overall impact on the program. The need for better defini-
tion of Weapon Systems Manager's responsibility, authority, and inter-
relationships was one of the reported problems (V.B.2.a). Another
was that the Weapon Systems Manager's responsibilities are not fully

supported by NAVAIRSYSCOM. Clearly defined and recognized authority
was ranked as the most significant element essential to effective Model
Management (V.B.3). Although authority recognition is a characteristic
problem with matrix organizations, the situation is aggrevated in the
Model Management program with the decentralized location away from
the functional managers at NAVA1RSYSCOMHQ and by the lack of funding
control (Table 5-10, Physical Location and Table 5-8, Input Funding).
Therefore, overall program control by the Weapon Systems Manager is
inadequate due to : lack of recognition of WSM authority and responsibility
by all NAVAIR groups, Field Activities, and CNO; and a tendency of
functional support groups at NAVAIR and Field Activities not to coor -
dinate decisions having overall program impact with the WSM ,
AIRTASK signoff authority has not been assigned to the
Weapon Systems Manager and is another situation resulting from respon-
sibilities not being recognized by NAVAIR (Table 5-10, Authority).
Although the Weapon Systems Manager is responsible for the planning
and execution of efforts at various Field Activities in support of his
program (such as test and evaluation programs), he does not have the
authority to sign-off the AIRTASK that he must prepare to direct the
efforts (Table 5-7, Responsibilities). This means that the responsible
code of the AIRTASK is someone other than the Weapon Systems Manager
who actually has the overall responsibility. Therefore, overall program
control by the Weapon Systems Manager is also inadequate due to lack of
AIRTASK sign-off authority .
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Another area that is becoming increasingly more deficient
and affects overall program control is the Informal Status System. In
spite of the fact that program prestige and charisma are already poor on
older out-of-production systems, several Model Management programs
have experienced further degradation in informal program authority by
assignment of junior level officers or officers with colateral duties to
the Weapon Systems Manager position (Table 5-11, Informal Status
System). One of the reported problems was a lack of functional and
Field Activity support for old aircraft (V.B.2.a). Clearly defined and
recognized authority was ranked first and program priority was ranked
sixth among those elements considered essential to effective Model
Management (V. B.3). Therefore, overall program control by the
Weapon Systems Manager is inadequate due to degradation of informal
program authority by junior officers and/or colateral assignments to
the WSM position.
A related problem to the preceding one that tends to further
degrade program authority is the Command level responsible for provid-
ing the Weapon Systems Manager's fitness report. Initially, with the
advent of the Model Management program, the need was recognized for
a concurrent fitness report from the Field Activity Commanding Officer,
to which the Weapon Systems Manager was administratively assigned,
and from NAVAIRSYSCOM (AIR -04), to which he was functionally
responsible. Recently, however, the practice of providing a concurrent
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fitness report for most Weapon Systems Managers from AIR -04 has
been terminated. With only a single fitness report from the Field
Activity Commanding Officer, program management objectivity ceases
when there is a conflict between program priorities and those estab-
lished by the Field Activity to which the Weapon Systems Manager is
assigned (Table 5-10, Reward and Incentive Criteria). Therefore,
overall program control is inadequate due to degradation of program
management objectivity when the Weapon Systems Manager's fitness
reports are provided solely by the assigned Field Activity Commanding
Officer .
Another deficiency of the Model Management Organization
relates to Reward and Incentive Criteria. One of the problems typical
of matrix organizations is that the fitness reports and performance
evaluations for Participating Managers in the functional support groups
are normally appraised within the functional groups instead of by the
Weapon Systems Manager whom they support (Table 5-10, Reward and
Incentive Criteria). Again, as indicated previously, one of the reported
problems was a lack of functional and Field Activity support for old
aircraft. Overall program control by the Weapon Systems Manager is
therefore inadequate due to non-participation of the WSM in fitness
rqport and performance evaluations of personnel in functional support
areas.

VI. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SUMMARY
Section I stated that the primary objective of this study was to im-
prove the effectiveness of Weapon Systems Management within the Naval
Air Systems Command. The planned method of achieving this objective
was to systematically perform an organizational analysis of all phases
of the management system with the intent of identifying deficiencies and
possibly influencing some forms of corrective action.
In addition to researching the basic literature on organization and
systems theory, and reviewing pertinent Defense Department directives
and instructions, a significant number of experienced managers from
many of the Project and Model Management Offices were interviewed to
establish an information base. A Systems Analysis Model was developed
to define the management organization and present the collected informa-
tion in an organized format in Section IV.
An evaluation of the two distinct management organizations, Project
Management and Model Management, was made in Section V by reviewing
their operational requirements (mission/goals, responsibilities, etc. ) in
light of available abilities and assets. Additional information collected
during the interviews was also presented in Section V to further sub-
stantiate conclusions drawn from an evaluation regarding the adequacy
of the Project and Model Management Organizations to accomplish their
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operational requirements. A summary of these conclusions is presented
in the following paragraphs.
B. CONCLUSIONS
The results of the evaluation in Section V indicated that while there
are good features to the Weapon Systems Management Organization, there
are also many deficiencies that reduce overall effectiveness. The result-
ing conclusions are listed in the following paragraphs for both Project
Management and Model Management.
1. Project Management
(a) Good Features (Refer to Section V.A.4.a)
(1) A centralized and dedicated management organization
is provided for integrating the diverse functional activ-
ities of RDT&E, procurement, and initial deployments
of a complex weapon system.
(2) The matrix organizational structure utilized by NAV-
AIRSYSCOM Project Management provides an efficient
use of scarce personnel resources where there are a
large number of complex projects to support.
(3) Overall project control in most areas other than
logistics support is adequate.
(b) Deficiencies (Refer to Section V a A. 4.b)
(1) Overall project effectiveness in accomplishing mission/
goals is reduced due to:
Erosion of Project Manager's basic function to
manage the project.
Requirement to continually promote and defend the
project before higher levels of DOD and Congress.




Conflicting and frequently changing requirements
from higher authority.
Continually diminishing engineering and logistics
talent within functional areas at NAVAIRSYSCOM.
Problem of obtaining and keeping highly qualified
civilian personnel due to lack of career development
and promotional opportunities within the project
office.
General problems characteristic of a matrix
organization.
(2) Management ability over logistics support is degraded
due to:
Lack of Project Manager control over &MN funds.
Practice of directing project funds to Participating
Managers in functional areas instead of to the APML
who has lead ILS responsibility.
Lack of flexibility in utilizing different appropriation
categories suchas APN-1, APN-5, APN-6, APN-7,
and O&MN.
(3) Management ability over responsibilities related to
basic design and performance is degraded when project
funds are directed to Participating Managers in the
functional areas instead of to the Class Desk who has
the lead engineering responsibility.
2. Model Management
(a) Good Features (Refer to Section V. B. 4. a)
(1) A centralized and dedicated effort (within the Model
Management Office) is provided toward the support of
an out-of-production weapon system.
(2) Response to Fleet reported problems is facilitated
(within funding constraints) due to collocation of Model
Management Office, and key logistics support groups
such as the Cognizant Field Activity (CFA) and Desig-
nated Overhaul Point (DOP).
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(b) Deficiencies (Refer to Section V. B.4.b)
(1) Overall program control by the Weapon Systems
Manager (WSM) is inadequate due to:
Lack of recognition of WSM authority and respon-
sibilities by all NAVAIRSYSCOM groups, Field
Activities, and CNO.
Tendency of functional support groups at NAVAIR-
SYSCOMHQ and Field Activities not to coordinate
decisions having overall program impact with the
WSM.
Lack of WSM control over any funds.
Lack of AIRTASK sign-off authority.
Degradation of informal program authority by junior
officer and/or colateral assignments to WSM positions,
Degradation of program management objectivity
when WSM fitness reports are provided solely by the
assigned Field Activity Commanding Officer.
Non-participation of WSM in fitness report and per-
formance evaluations of personnel in functional sup-
port areas.
(Z) Management ability over an Integrated Logistics Support
Program is significantly degraded due to lack of funding
control.
(3) Fleet logistics support is significantly restricted due to
lack of available program funds when needed.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
In order to improve the effectiveness of Weapon Systems Management
within the Naval Air Systems Command, it is recommended that appro-
priate action be taken to resolve the deficiencies identified in the con-
clusions to this study. Furthermore, in those areas where there are

already organizational changes currently underway, it is recommended
that special consideration be given toward ensuring that the existing









4. How long in current position:
a. If less than three years, give relevant background to current
position.
II. Program Size, Phase, and Activity:
#1 #2 #3
1. List Aircraft System(s) by Type-Model- TMS TMS TMS
Series: (Group Systems as appropriate)
2. Identify Systems: Pre-Production
In-Production
Out -of-Production
3. Approximate number of Aircraft
Systems currently in service
4. Approximate number of years
Systems have been in service







6. Cognizant assignments to Field Activities
Basic Design Cog
Maintenance Engineering Cog
7. Approximate number of ECP's in last
12 months
III. Project Management Problems :




IV. Project Management Effectiveness
1. What actions do you believe should be taken to improve the
management effectiveness of your project?
V. Essential Elements to Effective Project Management:
a. Examine the elements listed below in light of requirements that
contribute to effective project management. Add any additional
requirements not shown that you believe could impact a program.
b. Indicate the RANK ORDER OF SIGNIFICANCE for each element
in the RANK column by assigning 1 to the most significant, 2 to




CLEARLY DEFINED AND RECOGNIZED AUTHORITY
GOOD WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH CONTRACTOR
AVAILABILITY OF FUNDING TO PROJECT
(RDT&E, Procurement, O&MN, OSIP)
CONTROL OF PROJECT FUNDING
(RDT&E, Procurement, O&MN, OSIP)
AVAILABILITY OF TRAVEL
PROJECT PRIORITY
GOOD PROJECT MANAGEMENT TALENT
GOOD MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEM
GOOD WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH CNO
AND FLEET COMMANDERS







REPORTED PROJECT AND MODEL MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS
A list of management problems reported from interviewing thirty-
five experienced Project and Model Management personnel is provided
below. The problem statements have been edited, grouped, and cat-
egorized as required for easy reference. Many of the problem state-
ments are the result of inputs from several individuals, and most are
the result of more than one input.
A. FUNDING PROBLEMS
1. Lack of flexibility with funding due to different appropriation
categories (APN-1, APN-5, APN-6, APN-7, O&MN, etc.).
2. Project Manager has no control over O&MN funds allocated to
support his project.
3. Budget changes by Congress, NAVCOMP, and OMB have severe
impact on project and increase out-year costs.
4. Budget cycle is inflexible. Budget cycles and project cycles
are out-of-synch.
5. Project funds on many projects are directed to Participating
Managers in the functional groups bypassing the APML who
has the lead ILS responsibility. The same problem exists for
the Class Desk who has basic design engineering responsibility.
6. Non-control of available funds by Weapon Systems Manager.
7. Lack of adequate funds to Weapon Systems Manager for
engineering and logistics support of older aircraft.
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B. PROBLEMS WITH HIGHER AUTHORITY
1. Lack of adequate project support and funding from higher
authority.
2. Ambiguous and frequently changing requirements from higher
authority.
3. Micro-Management from higher authority.
4. Excessive demands on Project Manager and staff's time for
briefs and pre-briefs to higher authority.
5. Extensive paperwork, documentation, DCP's, test plans, and
details for higher authority.
6. General requirement to not be completely honest in order to
get things done and keep project moving.
C. PERSONNEL RESOURCES PROBLEMS
1. Continually diminishing engineering and logistics talent.
Due to lack of sufficient personnel, never able to spend enough
time on any given project to do an adequate job.
2. Individual and parochial interest and general lack of overall
motivation interferes with project interest.
3. Slow Command response to personnel requirements.
4. Lack of qualified personnel in engineering and logistics func-
tional areas.
5. Lack of career development and promotional opportunities for
civilian staff within the project office.
D. MANAGEMENT AND 'ORGANIZATION PROBLEMS
1. Lack of proper communication and coordination between project
office and project team members in functional areas. Also,
between other project managers on common equipments.
2. Uncertainty of organizational elements in support of project.
3. Need better definition of Project and Model Management
responsibilities, authority, and interrelationship.
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4. More authority and responsibility is needed over individuals
assigned to functional groups.
5. Difficult to generate team spirit in matrix organization,
6. Weapon Systems Manager's responsibilities are not fully
supported by NAVAIRSYSCOM - responsibilities exceed
authority.
7. Program decisions made by functional groups are not coor-
dinated with the Weapon Systems Manager.




ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS TO EFFECTIVE PROGRAM MANAGEMENT
The following tables contain the results of an evaluation to determine
those elements considered essential to effective program management.
A proposed list of elements was presented to seventeen experienced
Project and Model Management personnel during an interview. They
were asked to revise the list as required and then rank them in order of
significance. In the following tables, the Pre-Production, Production,
and Out-of-Production Phases are represented by Phases 1, 2, and 3
respectively.
Table B-l presents the raw data from the seventeen managers asked
to rank the elements. The Project Phase column represents a given pro-
ject that is currently managing weapon systems in the phases shown.
For example, a project having systems in all three phases would be
represented by phases 1, 2, 3. Those elements considered most essen-
tial were ranked number one and those least essential were ranked
number ten. Some managers assigned equal ranking to several elements,
and these are shown by their fractional location on a scale from one to
ten.
Table B-2 presents the weighted average results of the ranked
elements for each separate phase category and for the combination of

phases 1 and 2. For example, since Project Management involves
management of weapon systems in both phases 1 and 2, the far right
column represents the weighted average results for Project Management.
Likewise, Model Management is represented by the phase 3 column since
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TABLE C-2
RANKING RESULTS (WEIGHTED AVERAGE) OF
ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS TO EFFECTIVE PROGRAM MANAGEMENT
ELEMENT
































DEFINITION OF GENERAL TERMS AND PROJECT RELATED MANAGERS
1 . General Terms
a. Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council (DSARC) :
An advisory body to the Secretary of Defense on major systems acquisition.
The Council members are the OSD staff principals [DOD DIR 5000. 1/
5000. Z).
b. Field Activity : A subordinate Command remotely located
to the Naval Air Systems Command Headquarters in Washington, D. C.
c. Functional Group or Organization : An organization that is
functionally categorized by activity, discipline, or product. Refer to
Section II. B. 1 for a more detailed description.
d. Integrated Logistics Support (ILS) : The support effort
required to integrate the various elements of supply and maintenance
that is essential to proper operation of a weapon system in the Fleet
[SECNAVINST 4000. 29A, OPNAVINST 4100. 3A, NAVMATINST 4000. 20A].
e. Life-Cycle : The complete life of a weapon system which
includes its acquisition, deployment and retirement. The three life-
cycle phases, as defined in this study, are Pre-Production, Production,
and Out-of-Production Phases.
f. Matrix Organization : A hybrid between the functional and
project organization in which assigned personnel receive project direction

from the Project Manager while remaining in their functional groups
for administrative supervision. Refer to Section II. B. 3 for a more
detailed description.
g. Model Management : Weapon systems management during
the Out-of-Production Phase of the weapon system's life-cycle as defined
in NAVAIRINST 5400. 70. The program is normally assigned to a Weapon
Systems Manager (WSM) at a designated Field Activity.
h. Navy System Acquisition Review Council (NSARC): A
council established by the Secretary of the Navy as an advisory body to
him and through him to the Secretary of Defense on major system
acquisitions. The NSARC is chaired by the Secretary/Under Secretary
of the Navy and is similar in functional composition, responsibilities
and operation to the DSARC [DOD DIR 5000. 1/5000. 2].
i. Project Management : Weapon systems management during
the Pre-Production and Production Phases of the weapon system's life-
cycle as defined in DOD INST 7000. 1 and the project charter. Major
programs are normally assigned to a Project Manager (PMA) and minor
programs to an Aircraft Project Coordinator (APC), both located at
NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ.
j. Project Organization : An organization that is character-
ized by output or purpose. It is a self-contained organization that com-
bines many functional skills whose emphasis is on cost and schedule.
All project personnel are both functionally and administratively assigned
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to the Project Manager. Refer to Section II. B. 2 for a more detailed
description.
k. Systems Acquisition Proces s : A sequence of specified
decision events and phases of activity directed to achievement of estab-
lished program objectives in the acquisition of weapon systems. The
process extends from approval of mission need, through exploration
of alternative systems, competitive demonstrations, full scale develop-
ment, test and evaluation, production, and successful deployment or
termination of the program.
1. Weapon Systems Management : The centralized management
and integration of all aspects of a weapon system throughout its complete
life-cycle. This includes Project Management during the Pre-Production
and Production Phases and Model Management during the Out-of-Produc-
tion Phase.
2. Chief of Naval Operations Managers
a. Appropriation Sponsor : The Appropriation Sponsor is a
DCNO (Deputy Chief of Naval Operations) or DMSO (Deputy Major Staff
Office) with supervisory control over an appropriation. The Director
RDT&E (OP-098) is Appropriation Sponsor for RDT&cE appropriations.
b. Mission Sponsor : A Mission Sponsor is a DCNO or DMSO
responsible for developing the overall goals, objectives, rationale,
justification, and resource requirements, for a specified mission area.




c. Function Sponsor : A Function Sponsor is the DCNO or
DMSO responsible for the preparation, substantiation, and justification
of a Navy position on the level, composition, and related direct support
for a force, platform, or support area. He receives guidance from the
Mission Sponsor relative to mission related requirements.
d. Program Sponsor: A Program Sponsor is a DCNO or DMSO
who is responsible for determining program objectives, time phased
support requirements, and for appraising progress, readiness, and
military worth for a given weapon system. His efforts are in support
of the goals and objectives of the appropriate Mission Sponsor.
e. Program Coordinator : The Program Coordinator is
responsible to the Program Sponsor for formulation and administration
of an acquisition program. He is the focal point for all input-output
OPNAV actions. The Program Coordinator for Aircraft and Weapons
is OP-506.
3. Project Related NAVAIRSYSCOM Managers
a. Project Manager, Aircraft (PMA) : The PMA is a Chief of
Naval Material chartered manager of a major project (cost in excess of
$75 million for RDT&E and $300 million for procurement). His position
is normally established within the Naval Air Systems Command.
b. Aircraft Project Coordinator (APC) : The APC is designated
by and established within the Naval Air Systems Command as a manager
of less than major projects. His functions are essentially the same as
that of a PMA.
l a-\

c. Weapon Systems Manager (WSM) : The WSM is a manager
of an out-of-production aircraft weapon system assigned by the Naval
Air Systems Command (AIR -04) to a Field Activity. The purpose of
assignment of a WSM is part of the NAVAIRSYSCOM Model Management
Program (NAVAIRINST 5400. 70) to decentralize management respon-
sibilities at the Headquarters level. It is a logical extension of the
transition of AIR -04 maintenance engineering and AIR -05 basic design
engineering responsibilities to a Field Activity such as a Naval Air
Rework Facility.
d. Class Desk (AIR-510): The NAVAIRSYSCOM Class Desk
has the lead engineering responsibility for basic weapon systems design
and performance. He is an extremely important member of the project
team especially during the systems acquisition phase.
e. Assistant Project Manager, Logistics (APML/AIR -410) :
The APML plans and manages the integrated logistics support (ILS) of
the weapon system. The APML also assumes the lead management
position within the functional groups at NAVAIRSYSCOM for out-of-
production systems during the transition period prior to assignment to a
WSM at a Field Activity.
f. Requiring Manager (RM) : The administrator of a budget
within NAVAIRSYSCOM who has the authority to direct project funds
by Project Directive (PD) which authorizes fund commitment. The
Requiring Manager is normally a designated official among the project
office staff.

g. Participating Manager (PARM): A designated manager
within the functional groups in NAVAIRSYSCOM that has the authority
to initiate and/or commit project funds identified by Project Directive
in an appropriate funding document such as a Procurement Request,
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